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On de Finetti’s instrumentalist philosophy of probability
    Joseph Berkovitz1 
Abstract. De Finetti is one of the founding fathers of the subjective school of probability. He 
held that probabilities are subjective, coherent degrees of expectation, and he argued that none of 
the objective interpretations of probability make sense. While his theory has been influential in 
science and philosophy, it has encountered various objections. I argue that these objections 
overlook central aspects of de Finetti’s philosophy of probability and are largely unfounded. I 
propose a new interpretation of de Finetti’s theory that highlights these aspects and explains how 
they are an integral part of de Finetti’s instrumentalist philosophy of probability. I conclude by 
drawing an analogy between misconceptions about de Finetti’s philosophy of probability and 
common misconceptions about instrumentalism. 
1. Introduction
De Finetti is one of the founding fathers of the modern subjective school of probability. 
In this school of thought, probabilities are commonly conceived as coherent degrees of 
belief, and expectations are defined in terms of such probabilities. By contrast, de Finetti 
took expectation as the fundamental concept of his theory of probability and subjective 
probability as derivable from expectation. In his theory, probabilities are coherent 
degrees of expectation.2  
De Finetti represents the radical wing of the subjective school of probability, 
denying the existence of objective probabilities. He held that probabilities and 
probabilistic reasoning are subjective and that none of the objective interpretations of 
probability make sense. Accordingly, he rejected the idea that subjective probabilities are 
guesses, predictions, or hypotheses about objective probabilities. 
While de Finetti’s theory has been influential in science and philosophy, it has also 
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2 A few preliminary comments are in place: 1. As we shall see in Section 4.6, in de Finetti’s 
theory the notion of expectation is taken to be a ‘primitive’. A degree of expectation about an 
event (proposition) is the expectation of the binary random-variable that represents the occurrence 
of that event (truth-value of that proposition), which is not defined as a probabilistic weighted 
sum.  2. The distinction between the terms ‘degree of belief’ and ‘degree of expectation’ is 
interesting and important, but its consideration goes beyond the scope of this paper. In any case, 
this distinction will not play an essential role in most of the discussion below. 3. In what follows, 
I shall talk about degrees of expectation about both events and propositions. The analysis of 
degrees of expectation about events can easily be translated to the analysis of degrees of 
expectation about propositions and vice versa. In fact, de Finetti frequently used the term ‘event’ 
to refer to propositions. 4. For ease of presentation, in discussing the literature on de Finetti’s 
theory, I shall sometimes follow the common terminology and refer to subjective probabilities as 
coherent degrees of belief or coherent credences.  
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attracted heavy criticism. De Finetti’s concept of probability is commonly conceived as 
being too permissive, licensing degrees of belief that we would normally consider 
imprudent. Thus, for example, in the Stanford Encyclopaedia entry on interpretations of 
probability, Hájek (2012, Section 3.3) comments that  
 
[o]rthodox Bayesians in the style of de Finetti recognize no rational constraints on 
subjective probabilities beyond: (i) conformity to the probability calculus, and (ii) a 
rule for updating probabilities in the face of new evidence, known as conditioning. 
… This is a permissive epistemology, licensing doxastic states that we would 
normally call crazy.3 
 
Such a view may also explain the popular opinion among scientists and philosophers that 
subjective probabilities of the kind that de Finetti’s theory sanctions are inadequate for 
science. R. A. Fisher, for a notable example, thought that “advocates of inverse 
probabilities [i.e. Bayesians] seem forced to regard mathematical probability … as 
measuring merely psychological tendencies, theorems respecting which are useless for 
scientific purposes” (Fisher 1971, pp. 6-7). Dawid and Galavotti (2008, p. 97) suggest 
that  
 
[a] bad consequence of de Finetti’s statement that [probability does not exist] is that 
of fostering the feeling that subjectivism is surrounded by a halo of arbitrariness. 
The suspicion that subjectivism represents an “anything goes” approach is actually 
shared by researchers from a variety of fields.  
 
Dawid and Galavotti single out physicists and forensic scientists as prime examples of 
scientific communities that share these sentiments. 
Further, de Finetti is commonly interpreted as offering an operational, 
behaviourist definition of probability. The idea is that subjective probabilities are 
coherent degrees of belief, and degrees of belief and their coherence conditions are 
defined in terms of behaviour and behavioural dispositions in actual or hypothetical 
betting scenarios. Thus, de Finetti’s philosophy of probability is portrayed as reductionist 
and behaviourist, and his theory is said to inherit the difficulties embodied in 
                                               
3 For a similar criticism, see for example Kyburg (1970, Chap. 6), Psillos (2007, p. 45), Bunge 
(2012, Chap. 11), Talbot (2016, Section 4.2F), and Williamson (2017, p. 78). Some authors agree 
with Hájek that Bayesianism of the style of de Finetti only imposes the constraints (i) and (ii), but 
do not conceive de Finetti’s epistemology as permissive. Rather, in analogy with deductive logic, 
they take subjective probability a la de Finetti to provide a logic of partial belief (Gillies 1973, 
Chap. 1; Howson 2000) or a logic of inductive inference (Howson and Urbach 2006, Chap. 9). 
Although some of de Finetti’s writings may suggest such an interpretation, I believe that it is 
inadequate. I will propose below that de Finetti conceived his theory of probability as much 
broader.  
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operationalism and behaviourism (Joyce 1998, pp. 583-584, Gillies 2000, pp. 58, 137-
144, Eriksson and Hájek 2007, pp. 185-190, Hájek 2012, Section 3.5.2).  
De Finetti’s celebrated Dutch Book argument for why degrees of 
expectation/belief should satisfy the probability calculus has also been the subject of 
various objections. The Dutch Book argument is situated within a betting decision-
theoretic framework, where an agent is offered various bets by a cunning bookie. The 
agent’s degrees of expectation/belief determine the odds4 that the bookie posts for buying 
and selling the bets, and the bookie determines the directions of the bets. The main idea 
of the argument is that if the agent’s degrees of expectation/belief are incoherent and 
accordingly do not satisfy the probability calculus, they are subject to a Dutch Book, i.e. 
a set of bets in which the agent is bound to lose come what may. Many find the Dutch 
Book argument, or at least its common interpretation, defective (see, for example, 
Kyburg 1978, Kennedy and Chihara 1979, Christensen 1991, 1996, 2004, Armendt 1993, 
Howson and Urbach 1993, 2006, Maher 1993, Hájek 2005, 2008a,b, Vineberg 2001, 
2016). Moreover, it has been argued that the Dutch Book argument provides a pragmatic 
rather than epistemic justification for why degrees of belief should conform to the 
probability calculus (Skyrms 1984, Armendt 1993, Christensen 1996, 2004, Joyce 1998, 
2009).  
 I argue that the objections above are unfounded as they misinterpret or overlook 
essential characteristics of de Finetti’s instrumentalist philosophy of probability. First, I 
argue that de Finetti conceived probability theory as normative, sanctioning that 
probabilities be instrumental and accordingly be the outcome of rigorous inductive 
reasoning. The common interpretation conflates the ontological status of probabilities in 
de Finetti’s theory with the way they are to be determined. While in this theory the 
evaluation of probabilities always involves subjective judgment, de Finetti maintained 
that this judgment should be rigorous and based on all the available information. The 
upshot is that the common view that de Finetti’s epistemology is permissive and his 
concept of subjective probability inadequate for interpreting scientific theories is 
unwarranted. Second, I propose that when de Finetti talks about ‘operational definition’ 
of probability, he means a definition that allows for a measurement of probabilities rather 
than an operational definition in the traditional sense; and when he talks about 
‘operational foundations’ for his theory, he means instrumental foundations. I also argue 
that, while according to the common interpretation de Finetti offered a reductionist and 
behaviourist definition of probability, he was neither reductionist nor behaviourist, and he 
                                               
4 A bet is an option to receive (or give) a specified positive amount  (‘the stake’) if an event  
occurs, sold (bought) by a bookie for a price . The ratio  is ‘the odds’, and an agent 
will accept to buy a bet at these odds only if her degree of belief in E is equal or larger than the 
betting quotient . Betting quotients are odds normalized, so that their values lie within the 
half-open unit interval . This interval could be extended to the closed-unit interval  by 
allowing the odds to take the ‘value’  (Howson 2000, pp. 125-126).  
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did not intend to define probability in the traditional philosophical sense. Third, I argue 
that the main objections to de Finetti’s Dutch Book argument are based on 
misconceptions about his philosophy of probability and, moreover, that the claim that this 
argument provides only a pragmatic justification for why subjective probabilities should 
satisfy the probability calculus begs the question against instrumentalism. Indeed, in the 
context of de Finetti’s instrumentalist philosophy of probability, the Dutch Book 
argument does provide epistemic reasons to follow this calculus.  
 In the next section, I argue that, for these and other reasons, the common 
interpretation of de Finetti’s theory is flawed and I anticipate a new interpretation along 
instrumental lines. In Section 3, I develop this interpretation in more detail and argue that 
it integrates the various aspects of de Finetti’s philosophy of probability into a unified, 
coherent framework. On this interpretation, subjective probabilities are coherent degrees 
of expectation that are intended to be instrumental and accordingly should be the 
outcome of rigorous inductive reasoning. Since subjective probabilities are coherent 
degrees of expectation, the question arises as to the notion of coherence that is in play. 
Different interpretations of coherence imply different theories of probability. In Section 
4, I consider de Finetti’s notion of coherence. In the literature, a common view has it that 
coherence should be interpreted as a consistency condition. Consistency interpretations of 
coherence conceive the incoherence in Dutch bookable situations as a symptom of 
inconsistency of preferences, attitudes, action-guiding degrees of belief, or fair betting 
quotients (Ramsey 1926/1980, Skyrms 1984, 1987, Armendt 1993, Howson and Urbach 
1993, 2006, Christensen 1996, 2004, Hellman 1997, Briggs 2009, Mahtani 2015, 
Vineberg 2016). First, I argue that these interpretations and in fact almost all the other 
existing interpretations of de Finetti overlook his verificationism5: namely, the view that 
probabilities are assigned only to verifiable events or propositions. I then show how the 
proposed instrumentalist interpretation of de Finetti’s concept of coherence motivates his 
verificationism. I also consider the claim that the Dutch Book argument provides only a 
pragmatic, prudential rationale for degrees of belief to conform to the probability 
calculus, and Joyce’s (1998, 2009) influential argument that an analysis of what it means 
for a system of degrees of belief to accurately represent the world could offer an 
epistemic rationale for this calculus. In Section 5, I draw the implications of my proposed 
interpretation of de Finetti’s concept of coherence for the logical structure of 
probabilities. I argue that the logical structure of probabilities in de Finetti’s theory is 
different from the way it is commonly represented, and that this theory is in effect a ‘non-
classical’ theory of probability. In Section 6, I briefly argue that important aspects of de 
Finetti’s theory have been misinterpreted because of common misconceptions about 
instrumentalism, and I draw an analogy between misconceptions about de Finetti’s 
philosophy of probability and misconceptions about instrumentalism. In Section 7, I 
                                               
5 Mura (2009) is a notable exception. 
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summarize my main arguments and briefly comment on the nature of instrumental value 
and de Finetti’s view of imprecise probabilities.  
 First, however, a few general comments about the methodology I use in 
interpreting de Finetti’s theory and philosophy of probability. De Finetti’s writings extend 
over six decades, from the mid 1920s to the 1980s. It is reasonable to expect that de 
Finetti changed his mind on various issues during that period and that there might be 
some tension among his writings at different times. Yet, I believe that he was always 
instrumentalist about probability. In any case, my focus will be on de Finetti’s later 
philosophy as it is more mature and includes reflections on his earlier philosophy.6 I will 
argue below that in his later philosophy de Finetti was instrumentalist about probability, 
and the task of Sections 2-4 is to motivate this claim.  
 In addition to instrumentalism, the development of de Finetti’s philosophy of 
probability was also influenced by empiricism, pragmatism, and operationalism. De 
Finetti (1974a, p. xii) remarks that his philosophy was inspired by the “British 
philosophers Locke, Berkley and, above all, Hume!”, the “Pragmatism of Giovanni 
Vailati7 – who somehow ‘Italianized’ James and Peirce”, and operationalism: de Finetti 
notes that he “was very much struck by Einstein’s relativity of simultaneity, Mach and 
(later) Bridgman.” While all these philosophies had an influence on de Finetti, I believe 
that the main threads of his philosophy of probability could be accounted for by the 
proposed instrumentalist interpretation. However, due to the overlap between 
instrumentalism and pragmatism, various aspects of de Finetti’s philosophy could also be 
classified as pragmatist.  
 Finally, I assume that de Finetti’s terminology does not always agree with 
philosophers’ terminology. Although de Finetti was very philosophical in his thinking, he 
was not a philosopher by training, and there are good reasons to believe that he 
sometimes used philosophical terms and concepts differently from philosophers. In 
particular, I argue that when de Finetti says that he gives an operational definition of 
probability, he does not really mean such a definition.  
 
2. On the failings of the common interpretation 
 
In the common interpretation of de Finetti’s theory, probabilities are subjective degrees of 
belief that are only constrained by coherence and a rule for updating them in light of new 
evidence, the so-called ‘Bayes’ rule’. Probabilities are coherent degrees of belief that are 
defined operationally in terms of agents’ actual behaviour and/or dispositions to behave 
                                               
6 The main focus in de Finetti’s later writings is on the Theory of Probability (Vols. 1 and 2), 
Probability, Induction and Statistics, and Philosophical Lectures on Probabilities, which 
constitute his comprehensive attempts to present the main ideas of his theory and philosophy of 
probability.  
7 For Vailati’s philosophy, see for example Arrighi et al. (2010).  
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in betting circumstances. The operational definition is situated within a Bayesian 
decision-theoretic framework. In this framework, an agent is portrayed as having 
subjective probabilities and preferences about events and/or states of the world. The 
preferences are represented by subjective utilities, and the agent strives to maximize her 
expected utility, which is determined by her probabilities and preferences. This Bayesian 
decision-theoretic framework, which is portrayed as fundamental to de Finetti’s theory, is 
also used to explicate the notion of coherence of degrees of belief and argue that degrees 
of belief should be coherent on pain of being susceptible to a Dutch Book. 
 I will argue below that the common interpretation of de Finetti’s theory of 
probability is inadequate for various reasons. First, in contrast to this interpretation, I 
argue in Sections 2.1–2.2 that de Finetti did not give an operational definition of 
probability. Second, as we shall see in Section 2.3, it seems to follow from the common 
interpretation that in his later writings de Finetti changed the definition of probability but 
there is no textual evidence to support such a change. Third, the common interpretation 
overlooks important aspects of de Finetti’s philosophy of probability. In Section 2.4, I 
point out that it is a fundamental part of de Finetti’s theory of probability that 
probabilities are assigned only to verifiable events, yet the common interpretation fails to 
reflect de Finetti’s verificationism. In Section 2.5, I argue that the common interpretation 
overlooks an important normative aspect of de Finetti’s theory, namely that degrees of 
belief/expectation should be the outcome of a rigorous inductive reasoning. Fourth, in 
Section 2.6, I argue that, contrary to the common interpretation, de Finetti did not really 
intend to define probability, and that a definition of probability would run counter to his 
philosophy of probability. Fifth, in Section 4.4, I argue that although de Finetti discussed 
his theory of probability in the context of a Bayesian decision-theoretic framework, he 
did not conceive this framework as fundamental to his concept of probability. 
 
 
2.1 A measurement, not a definition 
 
The idea that de Finetti provided an operational definition of probability in a decision-
theoretic framework is naturally suggested by his writings. Indeed, de Finetti held that 
probability is closely related to rational decision-making, and he claimed to give an 
operational definition of probability in the context of a betting decision-theoretic 
framework. I will thus start first by reviewing the case for the common interpretation of 
de Finetti’s theory and then argue that it is based on misinterpretation of his writings. 
 Following Kolmogorov's (1933/1950) axiomatic formulation of probability, it is 
common to approach probability theory as a formal calculus that is in need of 
interpretation. De Finetti objected to this view. He held that “probability theory is not 
merely a formal, arbitrary construction, and its axioms cannot be chosen freely as 
conventions justified only by mathematical elegance or convenience. They should 
express all that is necessarily inherent in the notion of probability and nothing more” (de 
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Finetti 1972, pp. xiii-xiv). De Finetti thought of subjective probability as a guide to life 
under uncertainty. An agent’s subjective probabilities reflect her expectations in states of 
uncertainty: they are coherent degrees of expectation (de Finetti 2008, p. 52). Being a 
guide to life under uncertainty, subjective probabilities are intimately related to rational 
decision under uncertainty (de Finetti 1972, Chaps. 1-2; 1974a, pp. 76-89).  
 De Finetti also believed that “[i]n order to give an effective meaning to a notion – 
and not merely an appearance of such in a metaphysical-verbalistic sense – an operational 
definition is required.” Thus, he maintained that “the notion of probability, like other 
notions of practical significance, ought to be operationally defined” (de Finetti 1974a, p. 
76). His inspiration came from early 20th C physics.  
 
The notion of probability, like other notions of practical significance, ought to 
be operationally defined (in the way that has been particularly stressed in 
physics following Mach, Einstein, and Bridgman), that is, with reference to 
observations in experiments that are at least conceptually feasible. In our 
case, the experiments concern the behaviour of an individual (real or 
hypothetical) facing uncertainty (de Finetti 1972, p. xiv). 
 
In particular, since subjective probabilities are coherent degrees of expectation, the 
coherence conditions of degrees of expectation are to be explicated operationally, and 
these conditions may be treated as the ‘axioms’ of the formal theory of probability (de 
Finetti 1972, pp. xiii-xiv).  
 By operational definition of probability, de Finetti meant “a definition based 
on a criterion which allows us to measure it”, where  
  
[t]he criterion, the operative part of the definition which enables us to 
measure it, consists in this case of testing, through the decisions of an 
individual (which are observable), his opinions (previsions, probabilities), 
which are not directly observable (de Finetti, 1974a, p. 76).  
 
That is, de Finetti held that an adequate definition of probability requires that it could be 
measured and that the relation between an agent’s decisions under uncertainty and her 
subjective probabilities is a key to measuring these probabilities. He appealed to a 
Bayesian decision theory, where an agent’s probabilities are her coherent degrees of 
expectation, her utilities reflect her subjective preferences, and the outcomes of rational 
decisions are actions that maximize her subjective expected utility. In this framework, 
one could design scenarios in which it is possible to infer an agent’s subjective 
probabilities from her decisions.8 In particular, one could design betting scenarios in 
                                               
8 De Finetti (1937/1980, p. 61) takes the idea that betting reveals an agent’s subjective probability 
to be “trivial and obvious.” Yet, as we shall see below, in his later philosophy he considered this 
idea less obvious and opted for a different method of measuring probability. 
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which it is possible to infer from the agent’s decisions to accept certain betting quotients 
to her subjective probabilities. 
 The above quotation suggests that by ‘operational definition’ de Finetti did not 
mean an operational definition in the philosophical sense. He refers to probabilities as 
opinions that are indirectly observed rather than defined by the betting operation.9 These 
opinions are supposed to exist before the betting actually occurs and be observed by this 
operation. Further, de Finetti was worried that the non-linear relation between utility and 
money and the extent to which people care about their bets may render the betting 
decision-theoretic framework inadequate for measuring subjective probabilities, and, as 
Eriksson and Hájek (2007, p. 190) point out, these worries make no sense if probabilities 
are defined operationally. De Finetti was also worried that the existence of a bookie 
would create a game-theoretic-like scenario in which agents have reasons not to disclose 
their actual probabilities, and again such a worry makes no sense if betting is considered 
as an operational definition. By contrast, all the above concerns make perfect sense if 
betting is conceived as a measurement of subjective probabilities.     
 By ‘operational definition’ of subjective probability de Finetti meant that the 
concept of subjective probability should render subjective probabilities measureable and 
that the operation in question – the betting – provides a schema for such measurements. 
And by ‘operational foundations’ for his theory of probability, de Finetti meant 
instrumentalist foundations. As we shall see in Sections 2.4, 3.2 and 4.1–4.4, the 
measurability of probabilities is an essential part of these foundations.  
 
2.2 A measurement and definition? 
 
It may be suggested that the betting operation in the ‘operational definition of subjective 
probability’ at once defines and measures probability; for, at first blush, it seems possible 
to employ betting to operationally define probabilities and measure them. More generally, 
it may be suggested that the same kind of operation could be used to simultaneously 
define and measure a quantity.  
 This suggestion is conceptually incoherent, however. The defining operation in an 
operational definition of a quantity cannot both constitute what the quantity is and 
measure it. Measurements presuppose that the measured quantity exists before the 
                                               
9 De Finetti was not always careful in articulating his concept of probability and some of his 
writings could naturally be interpreted as advocating an operational definition of probability in 
the philosophical sense. For example, in his discussion in the Theory of Probability of two 
decision-theoretic frameworks for measuring probabilities and explicating coherence, he said that 
each of these frameworks will consist of “a scheme of decisions to which an individual (it could 
be You) can subject himself in order to reveal – in an operational manner – that value which, by 
definition, will be called his prevision of [a random quantity] , or in particular his probability 
of [an event] ” (de Finetti 1974a, p. 85).  
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measurement10, whereas in operational definitions the defined quantity is constituted by 
the defining operation. A measurement is supposed to correlate the measured quantity 
(e.g. the voltage of a car’s battery), which exists before the measurement and is 
independent of it, with some quantity of the measurement apparatus (e.g. the position of 
the dial of a voltmeter). By contrast, in an operational definition the defined quantity need 
not exist prior to the definition, at least not in the same manner as established by the 
definition, and it is not independent of the defining operation. Moreover, unlike 
measurements, in operational definitions it does not make sense to ask whether the 
operation that defines the quantity at issue could yield an error or inaccurate 
measurement. It makes sense to ask whether the operational definition is useful in 
specifying some pre-theoretical quantity, but not whether the defining operation yielded 
error or imprecision; for the defining operation constitutes what a measurement error is 
and the standard of accuracy. Consider, for example, an operational definition of length in 
terms of a rigid metre rod, e.g. the one in Paris. It makes no sense to say that the 
operation that defines the length of a metre is also a measurement of that length. Further, 
as Gillies (1972, pp. 6-7) notes, on the operationalist view it does not make sense to say 
that other operations, which are supposed to measure the length of the defining rod, may 
reveal that it is actually not one metre long.  
 Alternatively, it may be suggested that an operational definition could both 
measure one thing and define another corresponding thing. In particular, it may be 
suggested that an operational definition could measure a qualitative variable and defines a 
corresponding quantitative one. Consider, again, length. The idea here is that the defining 
operation in an operational definition of length – e.g. some operation that involves light 
rays – could measure a qualitative variable of length and at the same time defines a 
quantitative variable of length, which agrees with the qualitative variable of length: both 
variables satisfy the same ordinal relations. Similarly, it may be suggested that the 
operational definition of subjective probability in terms of betting measures an agent’s 
qualitative probabilities and at the same time defines her numerical probabilities, which 
preserve the ordinal relations of the qualitative probabilities. Thus, the betting operation 
could both define and measure an agent’s probabilities, though different ones.11  
 The above proposal may gain some support from the fact that de Finetti 
(1937/1980, p. 60) presents qualitative probability as “the notion of probability as it is 
conceived by all of us in everyday life.” De Finetti (ibid.) starts his discussion of the 
                                               
10 Quantum mechanics seems to provide a counterexample. For instance, in a measurement of 
position, a system that is in a superposition of various positions does not have any definite position 
before the measurement. But calling the operation that transforms a superposition of positions to 
a definite position a measurement of position is a misnomer. More generally, the so-called 
‘measurement’ in quantum mechanics is a misnomer. The term ‘measurement’ in this theory is 
more akin to a preparation or transformation of a state of a system, or perhaps an operational 
definition of a quantity. 
11 Gillies (2000, pp. 200-203) seems to advocate such a view in the context of the social sciences. 
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“logic of the probable” by proposing a system of axioms for qualitative probability as a 
basis for the derivation of numerical probability, and he notes that such a starting point 
has the advantage of “eliminating the notion of ‘money’” which is “foreign to the 
question of probability.” Further, while de Finetti (ibid., p. 61) takes betting to reveal an 
agent’s probabilities, he also talks about “the somewhat too concrete and perhaps 
artificial nature of the definition [of probability] based on bets.”   
 Nevertheless, this proposal encounters major difficulties. First, as we shall see in 
Sections 2.3-2.6, the view that de Finetti takes betting as providing an operational 
definition of probability does not fit well with central aspects of his philosophy of 
probability.  
 Second, the above proposal presupposes that the numerical probabilities that 
betting is supposed to define agree with the qualitative probabilities that betting is 
designed to measure. But this presupposition is far from obvious. The logical structure of 
qualitative probabilities might be different from that of numerical probabilities, and 
accordingly the qualitative probabilities that betting is supposed to measure might not 
agree with the numerical probabilities that this operation yields.12 Indeed, there is nothing 
in the betting operation that warrants an agreement between the qualitative probabilities 
that the agent is supposed to have prior to the betting and the numerical probabilities that 
the betting yields. An agent’s qualitative probabilities before betting would always agree 
with her numerical probabilities that are prompted by the betting if the former implied the 
latter. But if the concept of qualitative probability in question is such that qualitative 
probabilities imply numerical probabilities, numerical probabilities will in effect be just 
different representations of qualitative probabilities. If so, the proposal to interpret the 
operational definition of subjective probability as measuring qualitative probability and 
defining numerical probability, which agrees with the qualitative probability, is 
incoherent, as it boils down to the idea that the operational definition of subjective 
probability measures and defines the same kind of probability. 
 Third, the above proposal presupposes that agents always have qualitative 
probabilities before confronting the betting scenario and that betting measures these 
probabilities and transforms them into numerical probabilities. But bets might be on 
events about which an agent never thought or paid sufficient attention and accordingly 
had no qualitative probabilities prior to the betting. In fact, agents would probably find 
themselves in such a position with respect to many events and propositions. In such 
cases, they would be prompted by the invitation to bet to engage in inductive reasoning 
the outcome of which would be numerical probabilities.   
 
                                               
12 For a discussion of qualitative probabilities and their relations to numerical probabilities, see 
for example de Finetti (1937/1980), Koopman (1940a,b), Savage (1954/1972), Suppes and Zanotti 
(1976, 1982), Suppes (1994, 2009), and references therein. 
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2.3 Has de Finetti changed his definition of probability? 
 
In his earlier writings, de Finetti considered the measurement of subjective probabilities 
in the context of the betting decision-theoretic framework. In later writings, he expressed 
doubts about the adequacy of this framework for measuring probabilities. He thought that 
the interaction between an agent and a bookie creates a strategic (game-theoretic-like) 
decision scenario in which the agent may be encouraged to pronounce probabilities that 
deviate from her actual ones. In order to avoid this problem, de Finetti opted for a 
different framework for measuring probabilities – a variant of the Brier scoring-rule 
decision-theoretic framework (see Section 4.1) – that does not include a bookie. This 
suggests that de Finetti saw the Brier scoring-rule decision-theoretic framework as 
providing a way to improve the measurement of subjective probability rather than 
offering an alternative definition of it. By contrast, in the context of the common 
interpretation, where de Finetti is portrayed as giving an operational definition of 
probability, such a shift in framework presumably implies a change in the definition; for 
the defining operation that is involved in the Brier scoring-rule decision-theoretic 
framework is different from the one involved in the betting decision-theoretic framework. 
Yet, there is no textual evidence to support the view that de Finetti saw this shift as a 
change in the definition of probability.  
 De Finetti also saw the Brier scoring-rule decision-theoretic framework as 
providing a way to measure the success of subjective probabilities in tracking the 
occurrence of events and the truth-values of propositions, and this conception fits well 
with the interpretation of his theory along instrumental lines.  
 
2.4 On the importance of verification  
 
As we shall see in Sections 3.2 and 4.2, de Finetti held that probabilities are assigned only 
to verifiable events/propositions, and the proposed instrumentalist interpretation of his 
theory can explain why this requirement is fundamental to his philosophy of probability. 
The main idea is that in de Finetti’s theory, probabilities, i.e. coherent degrees of 
expectation, are instruments for managing uncertainty, and degrees of expectation about 
unverifiable events/propositions have no instrumental value. The common interpretation 
fails to reflect de Finetti’s verificationism and its importance for his philosophy of 
probability. The operational definition of probability applies to both verifiable and 
unverifiable events/propositions: it requires that agents be willing to bet on 
events/propositions, independently of whether they are verifiable. Relatedly, the common 
interpretation fails to reflect the fact that in de Finetti’s theory the notion of coherence of 
degrees of expectation/belief applies only to verifiable events/propositions. 
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2.5 On the normative aspects of de Finetti’s theory 
 
De Finetti conceived his theory of probability as normative, and the common 
interpretation overlooks an important aspect of its normativity. De Finetti’s theory is 
normative in two related ways:  
 
(a) Degrees of expectation have to be coherent; 
 
(b) Degrees of expectation should be the outcome of rigorous inductive reasoning 
(this aspect of de Finetti’s philosophy of probability will be discussed in Section 
3.3). 
 
The common interpretation addresses (a), but it completely overlooks (b), which arguably 
is the more important normative aspect of de Finetti’s theory. While coherence could be 
motivated on the grounds of instrumental value, it only captures a relatively minor 
(though important) aspect of the instrumental value of subjective probabilities. Coherent 
degrees of expectation could range widely in their instrumental value and the operational 
interpretation of de Finetti’s theory does not account for the importance of choosing those 
coherent degrees of expectation that are the most instrumental. This oversight may also 
explain why the common view is that de Finetti’s philosophy of probability champions a 
permissive epistemology.  
 
2.6 Is it a definition? 
 
The common view is that de Finetti defines probability. He is interpreted as providing a 
reductive definition of probability in terms of actual behaviour and/or disposition to 
behave in betting scenarios. While de Finetti’s writings may appear to support this view, 
it is questionable. De Finetti was neither reductionist nor behaviourist (I shall discuss this 
claim in Sections 3.3 and 3.5). His concept of probability is too open-ended to be 
captured by an operational definition or any other reductive definition. De Finetti 
explicates various aspects of his concept of probability, but, arguably, he never intended 
to define it. For example, while he held that probabilities are only assigned to verifiable 
events, he never attempted to define the nature of the verification that is at stake. De 
Finetti acknowledged that the notion of the verifiability of an event is “often vague and 
illusive” and thought that it is necessary “to recognize that there are various degrees and 
shades of meaning attached to [it]” (de Finetti 1974b, p. 260). He took a pragmatic 
attitude toward the kind and degree of verifiability that is required for events to have a 
probability. This pragmatic attitude allows for various kinds of verifiability, including 
cases in which verifiability is highly theoretical or idealized. De Finetti aimed for 
probability theory to be instrumental in a broad range of cases, and a definition of 
verifiability would restrict the range of its applications. For another example, de Finetti 
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held that subjective probability is always related to background knowledge. Yet, he never 
tried to define the nature of that knowledge (I will discuss some aspects of his conception 
of background knowledge in Section 3.3).  
 On the instrumentalist interpretation of de Finetti’s philosophy proposed here, 
there is no need to define subjective probability. The notion of subjective probability has 
to be clear enough to be an effective instrument in a broad range of contexts, and to be 
such an instrument probability does not require a definition. Indeed, a definition would 
limit its effectiveness as an instrument.   
 
3. On de Finetti’s instrumentalist philosophy of probability 
 
In the previous section, I argued that the common interpretation of de Finetti’s theory of 
probability is inadequate. I also proposed that de Finetti saw probability as being an 
instrument for managing expectations in states of uncertainty and anticipated some of the 
main ideas of his instrumentalist philosophy of probability. In this section, I spell out 
these ideas in more detail. In Section 3.2, I discuss the connection between de Finetti’s 
verificationism and his instrumentalism. In Section 3.3, I consider de Finetti’s view that 
the evaluation of probabilities should be the result of rigorous inductive reasoning and 
examine the role that intuitions play in this reasoning. Probabilities are evaluated relative 
to existing background knowledge and in light of new evidence. The update of 
probabilities in light of new evidence is represented by conditional probabilities and, 
following Kolmogorov’s axiomatization, conditional probability is commonly defined as 
a ratio of unconditional probabilities. In Section 3.4, I argue that in de Finetti’s theory 
probabilities are fundamentally conditional and that the common definition of conditional 
probability as a ratio of unconditional probabilities does not make sense. I also propose 
that in this theory all probabilities, prior and posterior, could be represented as 
conditionals with probabilistic consequent. I conclude in Section 3.5 by briefly 
considering some aspects of de Finetti’s anti-reductionist approach to probability. But 
first I turn to provide some direct textual evidence for de Finetti’s instrumentalism.  
 
3.1 Some textual evidence for de Finetti’s instrumentalism 
 
In his Philosophical Lectures on Probability, de Finetti (2008, p. 53) replies to the 
suggestion that his view about science is instrumentalist, taking probabilistic theories to 
be no “other than a set of rules for making forecasts”, that 
 
[i]f one takes science seriously, then one always considers it also as an instrument. 
Otherwise, what would it amount to? Building up houses of cards, empty of any 
application whatsoever! 
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Taken out of context, this remark hardly implies an instrumentalist philosophy of 
probability. De Finetti’s use of the word “also” may be consistent with a non-
instrumentalist interpretation of probability and probabilistic theories; for surely any 
realist will consider science also as an instrument. But looking at the exchange between 
de Finetti and his interlocutors that comes shortly before and after the above comment, 
the most plausible interpretation of the above remark is along instrumentalist lines, taking 
the phrase “then one always considers it also as” to mean an implication: namely, that 
taking science seriously implies that one has to interpret probabilistic theories along 
instrumental lines.13  
 On page 52, shortly before the above quotation, the following exchange occurs 
between de Finetti and ALPHA (Alberto Mura, the editor of de Finetti’s Philosophical 
Lectures on Probability). 
 
          DE FINETTI: … By looking at the outcome of a phenomenon we could be driven 
          to formulate a rule by virtue of which, in each case, things would blend in that way, 
          as if it were a necessary law of nature. … 
 
ALPHA: You say: from a deterministic theory like classical mechanics, one can 
obtain, by means of certain reasonable assumptions, laws which are formulated in 
terms of subjective probabilities. Therefore, those laws are not objective laws of 
nature. Rather, they are rules to give, in light of a deterministic theory, reasonable 
probability evaluations. 
 
DE FINETTI: This is, more or less, my position. 
 
Here de Finetti takes probabilistic laws to be rules of inference rather than laws of nature, 
a characteristically instrumentalist stance.   
 On page 53, immediately after the comment under consideration, de Finetti rejects 
the view, which is popular among realists, that science aims at approximate truth.  
 
ALPHA: Science can be understood as a set of assertions that at the very least have 
a pretention to be true. The most refined ones say “verisimilar.” Here verisimilitude 
is not to be understood as likelihood, but as truthlikeness. That is, it must be 
intended as closeness to truth. 
 
DE FINETTI: If we knew where truth was, we would not get close to it, we would 
go straight there. And if we do not know where it is, we cannot even know how far 
it is from us. 
                                               
13 The argument here is that de Finetti was instrumentalist about probability and probabilistic 
theories. The question whether he was an instrumentalist about science in general, as the above 
quotation may suggest, is interesting but goes beyond the scope of this study.  
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ALPHA: It is a normative idea. We may have good reasons to believe that a new 
theory is more verisimilar than the previous one, if the new theory survives certain 
empirical tests, exactly where the previous one failed. 
 
DE FINETTI: Speaking of empirical tests in the field of probability is a 
contradiction in terms: what we can say is that every possible result is possible; 
there is no possible result that would belie the theory. 
 
ALPHA: This is what I said before: probabilistic theories are not refutable. 
 
DE FINETTI: Yes, probabilistic theories are not refutable. 
 
In addition to his view that it makes sense neither to strive for approximately true theories 
nor for successive theories to be more approximately true, de Finetti also rejects the view 
that probabilistic theories are refutable. De Finetti’s stance is difficult to reconcile with a 
realist viewpoint about probabilistic theories, but it is easy to associate with an 
instrumentalist one. De Finetti maintained that although probabilistic theories are not 
refutable, there might be instrumental reasons to substitute them. In particular, when 
certain probabilistic theories are not sufficiently successful in accounting for given 
phenomena, it may be reasonable to substitute them for more successful or promising 
ones (ibid., p. 54).  
 Our focus above was on de Finetti’s articulation of his instrumentalism about 
probability in the Philosophical Lectures on Probability, where the question of 
instrumentalism is discussed explicitly. But de Finetti also expressed such an 
instrumentalist view in various other texts. For example, in his Theory of Probability he 
remarks that subjective probability could play its role as a guide for life under uncertainty 
independently of one’s metaphysical suppositions, and this view is also characteristic of 
instrumentalism. 
 
[P]robabilistic reasoning is completely unrelated to general philosophical 
controversies, such as Determinism versus Indeterminism, Realism versus 
Solipsism ... (de Finetti 1974a, p. xi). 
 
3.2 Verificationism and instrumentalism 
 
As we have seen in Section 2.3, de Finetti held that probabilities are assigned only to 
verifiable events/propositions (de Finetti 1974a, p. 34). He developed his view at the 
heydays of positivism and it may be argued that his verificationism is due to the influence 
of positivism. Yet, while positivism had an influence on de Finetti, his verificationism 
can be motivated by his instrumentalist philosophy of probability. The main idea, which 
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is developed in Sections 4.1–4.3, is the following. In de Finetti’s theory, probabilities are 
coherent degrees of expectation, and degrees of expectation about unverifiable 
events/propositions have no instrumental value. Further, as we shall see below and in 
Section 4.2, de Finetti’s notion of coherence is explicated in terms of instrumental value, 
and accordingly it only applies to degrees of expectation about verifiable 
events/propositions.  
 That de Finetti’s notion of coherent degree of expectation is explicated in 
instrumental terms is clear in the betting decision-theoretic framework. In this 
framework, coherence is explicated in monetary terms: incoherent degrees of expectation 
are susceptible to sure losses, whereas coherent degrees of expectation are not. But in the 
case of unverifiable events, bets are never concluded and accordingly agents never suffer 
any loss. Thus, in this framework it is impossible to distinguish between coherent and 
incoherent degrees of expectation about unverifiable events/propositions. In Section 4.2, I 
argue that the same is true for the Brier scoring-rule decision-theoretic framework, which 
de Finetti preferred in his later writings. 
 In the literature there is controversy about whether de Finetti’s concept of 
coherence is to be interpreted as some kind of consistency. Those who advocate the 
consistency interpretation of coherence argue that the incoherence in Dutch bookable 
situations is just a symptom of inconsistency of preferences, attitudes, action-guiding 
degrees of belief, or fair betting quotients. In Section 4.5, I discuss this alternative line of 
interpretation and argue that it fails because it overlooks the fundamental importance of 
the verifiability of events/propositions in de Finetti’s theory of probability.  
  
3.3 Intuition, prudence, and learning from experience    
 
De Finetti held that evaluating probabilities is a form of inductive reasoning14, and that to 
speak about inductive reasoning means to attribute validity to a mode of learning, “to 
consider it not as a result of capricious psychological reaction, but as a mental process 
susceptible of an analysis, interpretation, and justification” (de Finetti 1972, p. 147). De 
Finetti recommended various “obvious, but not superfluous” considerations that must 
underlie any probability evaluation, like for example to  
 
think about every aspect of the problem … try to imagine how things might 
go … encompass all conceivable possibilities, and also take into account that 
some might have escaped attention … identify those elements which, 
compared with others, might clarify or obscure certain issues … enlarge one’s  
view by comparing a given situation with others … attempt to discover the 
                                               
14 Obviously, such inductive reasoning may be dependent on probabilities. On the proposed 
interpretation, this is not a problem for de Finetti as he did not attempt to define probability, let 
alone provide a reductive definition. 
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possible reasons lying behind those evaluations of other people … (de Finetti 
1974a, pp. 183-184).  
 
 De Finetti warned against superficiality in evaluating probabilities – an attitude 
that is frequently associated with subjective probability. In particular, he warned against 
two common patterns of superficiality:  
 
on the one hand, You may think that the choice, being subjective, and 
therefore arbitrary, does not require too much of an effort in pinpointing one 
particular value rather than a different one; on the other hand, it might be 
thought that no mental effort is required, since it can be avoided by the 
mechanical application of some standardized procedure (de Finetti 1974a, p. 
179).  
 
That is, de Finetti rejected the idea that, being subjective, probabilities may be chosen 
arbitrarily or based on a mechanical application of a standardized procedure, so as to 
avoid a thorough consideration of the available evidence. He held that although 
probabilities are subjective and cannot be reduced to objective facts, an agent should 
aspire to assign probabilities that are, according to her best judgment, the most 
instrumental, and that such assignments require rigorous inductive reasoning.   
 De Finetti also warned against other misconceptions about the nature of the 
inductive reasoning involved in evaluating probabilities.  
 
In connexion with induction, the tendency to overestimate reason – often in 
an exclusive spirit – is particularly harmful. Reason, to my mind, is 
invaluable as a supplement to the other psycho-intuitive faculties, but never a 
substitute for them. Figuratively, reason is a pole that may keep the plant of 
intuitive thought from growing crooked, but it is not itself either a plant or a 
valid substitute for a plant. A consequence of this distortion is the elevation of 
deductive reasoning to the status of a standard  ...  Thus inductive reasoning is 
generally considered as something on a lower level, warranting caution and 
suspicion. Worse still, attempts to give it dignity try to change its nature 
making it seem like something that could almost be included under deductive 
reasoning (de Finetti 1972, pp. 147-148).  
 
The term ‘reason’ in the above paragraph is somewhat ambiguous. It can be interpreted in 
two different ways: either that ‘reason’ is not among the psycho-intuitive faculties, or that 
it is among these faculties but only plays a supportive role for other psycho-intuitive 
faculties which are fundamental for inductive reasoning. Either way, it is clear that, for de 
Finetti, ‘reason’ plays only a supportive role for the psycho-intuitive faculties that are 
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fundamental for the creative dimension of inductive reasoning. (For ease of presentation, 
in what follows when I refer to ‘psycho-intuitive faculties’ I mean these latter faculties.) 
More specifically, here ‘reason’ refers to the faculty that is applied in deductive logic, the 
mathematical theory of probability, and any other ‘superstructures’ that are important for 
the inductive reasoning involved in probability evaluation. De Finetti maintained that in 
order to reduce the risk of error, it is “useful to support intuition with suitable 
superstructures” (de Finetti 1974a, p. 25). Agents have to develop and refine their 
psycho-intuitive faculties and apply ‘reason’ to guard them against the tendency to fall 
into error. De Finetti’s philosophy of probability presupposes that agents have psycho-
intuitive faculties in virtue of which they are capable of forming instrumental opinions 
about uncertain events and, with the aid of the mathematical probability theory, 
instrumental probabilistic opinions. These opinions should be the outcome of rigorous 
inductive reasoning in which agents’ psycho-intuitive faculties play a crucial role. The 
literature has focused almost entirely on the ‘superstructures’ that are supposed to guard 
probabilistic reasoning from the risk of error and neglected the fundamental role that 
psycho-intuitive capacities play in such reasoning. This focus betrays a misguided 
conception of de Finetti’s view of probabilistic reasoning. It overlooks the central role 
that de Finetti ascribed to the creative intuitive aspect of the inductive reasoning that is 
involved in the evaluation of probabilities – an aspect that cannot be accounted for by a 
mechanical application of rules. Indeed, the common interpretation of de Finetti’s theory 
disregards the fact that de Finetti thought of the formal aspects of his theory only as 
supplementary to the psycho-intuitive faculties that underlie the evaluation of 
probabilities.  
 An important inductive reasoning that is involved in evaluating probabilities is 
learning from new information. There are two ways that an agent could adjust her 
probabilities in light of new information. One way is to keep her current opinion 
unchanged and updates it according to the new information, and the other is to revise it. 
“If we reason according to Bayes’ theorem, we do not change our opinion. We keep the 
same opinion, yet updated to the new situation” (de Finetti 2008, p. 35). That is, when 
one conditionalizes on new information, one keeps the same opinion yet updates it to the 
new situation. Another way an agent can adjust her probabilities is by changing her 
opinion, i.e. by revising her probability function. Change of opinion could result from 
reconsideration of neglected, inaccurate or ambiguous information, previous superficial 
or careless evaluations, change of mind about previous evaluations, etc.  
 De Finetti held that, realistically, the evolution of one’s probabilities involves 
both updating and revising. Indeed, as we saw above and as we shall see in Section 3.5, 
the idea that a mechanical-like rule for the evolution of probabilities, such as 
conditionalization, will have a universal validity runs against de Finetti’s anti-reductionist 
philosophy. De Finetti held that the only universal requirement on a probability 
evaluation is coherence (de Finetti 2008, p. 40). Bayes’ theorem is a synchronic 
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coherence condition on degrees of expectation. Thus, if one does not change one’s mind, 
the synchronic coherence condition embodied in Bayes’ theorem becomes a constraint on 
the evolution of one’s probabilities in light of new evidence. Yet, de Finetti thought that 
an agent may always change her mind. He held that “[t]here is nothing of which one 
cannot repent!” (ibid., p. 39). Indeed, as ‘non-ideal’ reasoners, humans need to ‘repent’ 
from time to time, if not more often.  
 De Finetti conceived of his theory of probability as normative, yet realistically 
geared for a person in the flesh rather than some abstract ideal reasoner. 
 
An ideal person should accurately take into account all the information she 
possesses. A person in the flesh makes her own evaluations according to what she 
remembers and is in a position to use (de Finetti 2008, p. 40).  
 
De Finetti recognized that mood, state of memory, and the ability to process information 
and recognize relations of relevance have an important influence on the ‘background 
knowledge’ to which probabilities are related. There are so many things that a person 
knows but forgets, and there are things that she “deems known to her with insufficient 
accuracy (and hence she hesitates to give an evaluation of them)” (ibid.). Further, a 
person’s mood could change from one moment to another and influence her evaluation.  
 
At a given moment, one could feel more optimistic, in another more pessimistic. A 
tiny obstacle with no importance could be enough to change our mood. This is 
something that pertains to everything and, to an even greater extent, to probabilistic 
reasoning (ibid.).   
 
It is noteworthy that while it is common in the literature on probabilistic reasoning to 
represent knowledge as propositional, de Finetti did not restrict background knowledge to 
propositional knowledge. He allowed for background knowledge and new evidence to 
include experience that is not expressible in propositional terms, “provided that the 
axioms – if we want to talk in axiomatic terms – remain unchanged” (ibid., p. 39).15  
 As in other conceptions of probability, symmetry considerations play a paramount 
role in the inductive reasoning that is involved in evaluating subjective probabilities. Yet, 
unlike objective theories of probability, the relevant symmetries are not symmetries ‘in 
the objects’ but rather symmetries ‘in the mind’, though beliefs about symmetries of the 
first kind often prompt the formation of symmetries of the second kind. A major kind of 
symmetry that de Finetti appeals to is ‘exchangeability’ (de Finetti 1937/1980, 1972, pp. 
209-246, 1974b, Chap. 11, 2008, Chaps. 8, 11, 13). A collection of events is said to be 
                                               
15 The question arises as to how such background knowledge could be integrated into the 
framework of the mathematical probability theory.  
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exchangeable if the subjective probability  that  of them occur depends only on  
and is independent of their order of appearance.16 Together with Bayes’ theorem, 
exchangeability allows subjective probability judgments to be updated by taking into 
account observed frequencies and explains “why expected future frequencies should be 
guessed according to past observed frequencies” (de Finetti 1970, p. 143, Galavotti 2008, 
p. xx). Granted exchangeability, “a rich enough experience leads us always to consider as 
probable future frequencies or distributions close to those which have been observed” (de 
Finetti 1937/1980, p. 102).  
 Learning from experience could also explain convergence of probability 
evaluations. Interpersonal agreement on probabilities is frequently achieved by similar 
experiences and training. Yet, subjective probabilities are often based on vague, uncertain 
or fragmentary information that does not relieve the “embarrassments of vagueness and 
interpersonal disagreement” (de Finetti 1972, pp. 143-144). De Finetti held that the 
effects of “[t]he disparity between the initial judgments of people or of vagueness in the 
initial judgments of one person are often largely eliminated” by new information that is 
sufficiently revealing. The idea is that, if prior probability distributions are “sufficiently 
gentle or diffuse,” i.e. not too opinionated, the conditionalization on such information 
often lead to posterior probabilities that depend very little on prior probabilities (ibid., p. 
145). There are various theorems that intend to demonstrate the independence of 
posterior probabilities from prior probabilities (see, for example, Savage 1954/1972, pp. 
46-50, Doob 1971, and Hawthorne 1993, 1994). Such theorems are not sufficient, 
however, to account for all the cases of convergence of posterior probabilities. There are 
cases in which the disparity between prior probabilities cannot be eliminated by updating 
(i.e. conditionalizing) on new information. In any case, as we have seen above, de Finetti 
held that realistically the evolution of subjective probabilities involves both updating and 
revising, and in some cases agreement in posterior probabilities involves revising 
probability distributions.  
 
3.4 On the relational nature of probabilities 
 
Learning from experience in the Bayesian tradition is typically represented by conditional 
probability: the probability of an event in light of new evidence is equal to the probability 
of that event given the new evidence (and the existing background knowledge). 
Following Kolmogorov’s (1933/1950) influential axiomatization of probability, it is 
common to define conditional probability in terms of unconditional probabilities. The 
                                               
16 De Finetti also appealed to a weaker symmetry condition, ‘partial exchangeability’, where a 
series of events is divided into  classes and the probability distribution remains invariant only 
under permutations within each of these classes. For an analysis of various conceptions of 
exchangeability and de Finetti’s ‘representation theorem’ for exchangeable random variables, see 
for example Diaconis (1977, 1988).		
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probability of  given  is defined as the ratio of the unconditional probability of 
 and the unconditional probability of :  
 
(KCP)   . 
 
 De Finetti rejected this axiomatic approach for two reasons. First, as we saw in 
Section 2.1, he held that the axioms of probability should express what is inherent in the 
notion of probability and nothing more. He thought of probabilities as rational degrees of 
expectation and coherence as a necessary condition for degrees of expectation to be 
rational, and he argued that the probability calculus could be derived from the coherence 
conditions of degrees of expectation (de Finetti 1972, Chaps. 1-2; 1974a, pp. x, 72-75, 
87-89). In de Finetti’s theory, Kolmogorov’s definition of conditional probability in 
terms of a ratio of unconditional probabilities is not a definition. Rather, the equality 
(KCP), or more precisely a corresponding equality, follows from the coherence 
conditions of the degrees of expectation about , , and given ; where the 
degree of expectation about  given  is not defined as the ratio of the degree of 
expectation about  and the degree of expectation about  (for more details, see 
below and footnote 19). 
 Second, while in the ratio definition of conditional probability the fundamental 
object of probability theory is unconditional probability, in de Finetti’s theory the 
fundamental object is conditional probability. Indeed, all probabilities, prior and 
posterior, are conditional probabilities. Every probability is conditional “not only on the 
mentality or psychology of the individual involved, at the time in question, but also, and 
essentially, on the state of information in which he finds himself at that moment” (de 
Finetti 1974a, p. 134). Thus, unconditional probability does not make sense unless it is a 
conditional probability in disguise. In order to highlight the fact that conditional 
probability is not defined in terms of unconditional probabilities, it will be convenient to 
use a notation in which the conditioning background knowledge and events are placed in 
the subscript rather than after the conditionalization stroke. For example, in this 
representation the probability of  given background knowledge  is denoted as 
.17  
 Granted de Finetti’s approach, the so-called ‘problem of priors’ – that is, the 
problem of determining the values of prior probabilities rationally – is misconceived. In 
principle, there is nothing special about prior probabilities. Like posterior probabilities, 
they are conditional on the background knowledge. Prior probabilities are conditional 
probabilities given the available information at the start of an inquiry. Indeed, in some 
                                               
17 Arguably, in all the main interpretations of probability the fundamental object is conditional 
probability (see Hájek 2003, Berkovitz 2015, Section 4.2, and references therein). 
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cases, such information will be insufficient to afford instrumental evaluations. But the 
challenge of evaluating probabilities in light of insufficient background knowledge exists 
for all probabilities, prior and posterior. In cases of insufficient information, the 
determination of probabilities may involve some degree of arbitrariness and accordingly 
the resultant probabilities may have lower or no instrumental value. It is noteworthy, 
however, that the challenge of evaluating probabilities in light of insufficient background 
knowledge also pertains to objective theories of probability; for evaluations of objective 
probabilities in such circumstances are expected to be unreliable.  
 If conditional probability is not defined in terms of a ratio of unconditional 
probabilities, the question arises as to its logical form. In de Finetti’s theory, an agent’s 
probability of  conditional on  is the probability that she attributes to  if she thinks 
that in addition to present information, , which is implicit, it will become known to her 
that  is true (and nothing else) (de Finetti, ibid.). Based on this characterization and on 
de Finetti’s representation of conditional probability as a called-off bet in the betting 
decision-theoretic framework and as a conditional penalty in the Brier scoring-rule 
decision-theoretic framework (see Section 4.1), one’s probability of  conditional on  
and the background knowledge  being equal to  could be interpreted as the following 
conditional:  
 
     (CP1) If I have the background knowledge  and come to know/believe/assume , 
                then my probability of  will be .
18 
                                               
18 De Finetti’s (1974a, p. 134) presentation of conditional probability is both ambiguous and 
potentially misleading. “In precise terms, we shall write  for the probability ‘of the event 
 conditional on the event ’ (or even the probability ‘of the conditional event ’), which 
is the probability that You attribute to  if you think that in addition to your present information, 
i.e. the  which we understand implicitly, it will become known to You that  is true (and 
nothing else)”; where the ‘conditional event’  is a conditional proposition that is true when 
 and  are true, false when  is true and  is false, and has no truth-value when  is false. 
(For the sake of simplicity, I will assume that H includes the background knowledge H0. Nothing 
essential in what follows will depend on this assumption.) The statement in the first brackets of 
the above quotation suggests that the conditional probability of  given  is to be understood 
as the unconditional probability of the conditional event , whereas the last part of the 
sentence suggests my interpretation above. There are at least two reasons why the interpretation 
of de Finetti’s concept of conditional probability as unconditional probability of a conditional 
event cannot be correct. First, as noted above, in de Finetti’s theory all probabilities are conditional 
on background knowledge and unconditional probabilities do not make sense. But if conditional 
probability were defined as an unconditional probability of a conditional event, it would 
fundamentally be an unconditional probability of such event, and accordingly will not be related 
to background knowledge.  
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(CP1) is true when I know, believe or assume  and my probability of  is , false 
when I know, believe or assume  and my probability of  is not , and has no 
truth-value when I do not know, believe, or assume . It is noteworthy that (CP1) is 
not any of the familiar conditionals. In particular, (CP1) is neither the material nor the strict 
conditional. For example, the material and the strict conditionals satisfy the following 
condition, call it Disjunction of Conditional Antecedent: ‘If , then ’ and ‘If , then 
’ imply ‘If  or , then ’. By contrast, (CP1) violates this condition: ‘if , then my 
probability of  is ’ and ‘if , then my probability of  is ’ do not imply ‘if  or 
, then my probability of  is ’. It is also noteworthy that when the probability of  
conditional on  is non-zero, ,  (CP1) implies an equality that corresponds to 
Kolmogorov’s definition of conditional probability, (KCL). That is, if , then 
                                               
 Second, the interpretation of conditional probability as unconditional probability of a 
conditional event is incompatible with de Finetti’s characterization of the measurement of 
conditional probability in terms of conditional penalty in the Brier scoring-rule decision-theoretic 
framework. Consider the Brier scoring-rule decision-theoretic framework (see Section 4.1), and 
suppose an agent with coherent degrees of expectation. In this framework, the decision of such an 
agent is comprised of the probabilities that she post for various propositions (events) , and 
the penalty she is subject to is proportional to the distance (i.e. the square root difference) between 
the posted probabilities and the values of the binary random-variables that represent whether these 
propositions (events) are true (occur). It is assumed that penalties for the various probabilities are 
additive and that the agent is trying to minimize her expected loss. Given these assumptions, the 
agent’s decision reflects her probabilities. The penalty for the conditional probability of  given 
 is conditional on  being true (occurring): ; where  and  are binary 
random-variables that represent respectively the truth-values (occurrences) of the propositions 
(events)  and . This conditional penalty is compatible with interpreting conditional 
probability as a conditional with a probabilistic consequent but not with interpreting it as an 
unconditional probability of a conditional event. If the conditional probability of  given  
were defined as the unconditional probability of the conditional event , the penalty would 
have to be ; where  is the random variable that is supposed to represent 
the truth-value of . But this penalty is ill defined, as  has no truth-value when  is 
false. 
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(CP1) – or in our proposed formal notation,  – implies 
.19 
 (CP1) does not apply to counterfactual background knowledge or counterfactual 
conditioning events. In such cases, the antecedent is false and accordingly (CP1) lacks a 
truth-value. Thus, this conditional is inadequate for representing counterfactual subjective 
probabilities. In counterfactual reasoning, subjective probability could be represented by a 
counterfactual with probabilistic consequent: 
 
      (CP2) If I had the background knowledge  and had come to know/believe/assume 
    , then my probability of  would have been .  
 
(CP2) is true if in the closest ‘possible worlds’ in which I know, believe or assume  
my probability of  is , false if in the closest ‘possible worlds’ in which I know, believe 
or assume  my probability of  is not , and has no truth-value in the closest 
‘possible worlds’ in which I do not know, believe or assume . (CP2) is neither 
Stalnaker’s (1968) nor Lewis’ (1973, 1986, Chaps. 16–18) counterfactual conditional. 
Unlike Lewis’ and Stalnaker’s counterfactual conditionals, it may lack a truth-value and it 
violates some of the inferences that these conditionals satisfy. In particular, unlike Lewis’ 
and Stalnaker’s conditionals, (CP2) violates (inferences that correspond to) the Disjunction 
of Conditional Antecedent.  
 
3.5 Flexible schemes 
 
As Sections 2.6 and 3.3 suggest, de Finetti was neither reductionist nor behaviourist. The 
notion of subjective probability he had in mind is too open-ended to be defined along a 
                                               
19 De Finetti (1972, pp. 15-16, 1974a, Section 4.3) demonstrates that a coherence condition on the 
degrees of expectation about conditional on ,  conditional on  and  conditional 
on  implies that, when the degree of expectation about  conditional on  is non-zero, 
the probability of  conditional on  is equal to the ratio of the probability of  
conditional on  and the probability of  conditional on . Thus, if we label the probability 
of  conditional on  as the ‘conditional probability of  given ’, the probability of 
 conditional on  as the ‘unconditional probability of ’ and the probability of  
conditional on  as the ‘unconditional probability of ’, we obtain the equality (KCP). 
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behaviourist or, more generally, reductionist lines. Relatedly, de Finetti thought that rigid 
schemes are counterproductive for probability theory. This view is reflected, for example, 
in his discussion of the ‘space of possibilities’ – namely, the range over which one’s 
uncertainty extends – in the Theory of Probability. 
  
         [T]hings are useful if and only if we retain the freedom to make use of them when, 
         and only when, they are useful, and only up to the point where they continue to be 
         useful. A scheme which is too rigid, too definitely adopted and taken ‘too    
         seriously’, ends up being employed without checking the extent to which it is useful 
         and sensible, and risks becoming Procrustean bed (de Finetti 1974a, p. 33). 
 
De Finetti returns to the same theme later on in the Appendix to the Theory of 
Probability, where he continues his analysis of the space of possibilities. 
 
To approach the formulation of a theory by starting off with a preassigned, rigid 
and ‘closed’ scheme seems to me a tiresome and cumbersome procedure, wherever 
it is followed. (It is true that it serves to guarantee one against antinomies and 
suchlike, but this is not a good reason for always having recourse to it; in the same 
way as it is not necessary to shut oneself inside a tank in order to journey through a 
peaceful and friendly country.) (De Finetti 1974b, p. 269, footnote †) 
 
Further on in the Appendix, de Finetti discusses again the space of possibilities, this time 
in the context of a comparison between the mathematical framework of his approach to 
probability and Kolmogorov’s, and he reiterates his objection to rigid frameworks.    
 
(1) we REJECT the idea of ‘atomic events’, and hence the systematic interpretation 
of events as sets; we REJECT a ready-made field of events (a Procrustean bed!), 
which imposes constraints on us; we REJECT any kind of restriction (such as, for 
example, that the events one can consider at some given moment, or in some given 
problem, should form a field) (de Finetti 1974b, p. 343). 
 
More generally, de Finetti held that for probability theory to be instrumental, it has to 
operate with flexible schemes and terms that could be applied broadly and revised 
according to the particular context. The psycho-intuitive faculties to which de Finetti 
ascribed a great importance in probabilistic reasoning are supposed to furnish humans 
with the ability to operate with ambiguous and flexible schemes. 
 
4 Coherence, instrumentalism and knowledge 
 
The analysis of de Finetti’s notion of coherence is a key to understanding his theory of 
probability. The classical argument for degrees of expectation/belief to be coherent, and 
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accordingly conform to the probability calculus, is the Dutch Book argument, which was 
explicitly put forward by Ramsey (1926/1980) and de Finetti (1937/1980). Recall 
(Section 3.2) that some hold that the Dutch Book argument merely dramatizes an 
inconsistency in preferences, attitudes, action-guiding beliefs, or fair betting quotients. In 
Section 4.5, I argue that such ‘consistency’ interpretations of coherence are incompatible 
with de Finetti’s instrumentalist philosophy of probability. In Section 4.6, I consider 
Joyce’s (1998, 2009) proposal that an agent’s degrees of belief in propositions are her 
best estimates of the truth-values of these propositions and his argument that the 
coherence of degrees of belief can be justified on the grounds that incoherent degrees of 
belief are less accurate estimates than some corresponding coherent ones. I argue that 
Joyce’s argument fails because his notion of gradational accuracy does not play any 
essential role in the argument. 
 In Section 4.2-4.4, I propose that de Finetti’s notion of coherent degrees of 
expectation/belief should be explicated in instrumental terms. I argue that this 
interpretation could explain why it is essential for de Finetti that events in probability 
assignments be verifiable and why the main objections to his Dutch Book argument are 
unwarranted. In Section 5, I consider the implications of the proposed interpretation for 
the logical structure of probabilities in de Finetti’s theory.  
 De Finetti discussed coherence in the context of two different decision-theoretic 
frameworks: the betting decision-theoretic framework and a variant of the Brier scoring-
rule decision-theoretic framework. In Section 4.1, I review these frameworks, and in 
Sections 4.2–4.4 I spell out in some detail how these frameworks are used to explicate the 
same instrumental notion of coherent degrees of expectation/belief. In both frameworks, 
coherence is explicated in terms of instrumental value, and instrumental value is 
characterized in monetary terms: incoherent degrees of expectation/belief might incur 
loss come what may, whereas incoherent degrees of expectation/belief might not. A 
common view has it that de Finetti’s arguments for coherence provide pragmatic rather 
than epistemic reasons for why degrees of expectation/belief should conform to the 
probability calculus. In Section 4.3, I argue that this view is question begging against de 
Finetti’s instrumentalism and that in the context of de Finetti’s theory the Dutch Book 
argument does provide epistemic reasons to follow the probability calculus. De Finetti 
saw his variant of the Brier scoring-rule decision-theoretic framework as a thoroughly 
concrete measure of success. In Section 4.4, I consider the merits of this decision-
theoretic framework as a framework for measuring instrumental value.  
 
4.1 The two decision-theoretic frameworks  
 
In de Finetti’s theory, subjective probabilities are coherent degrees of expectation. The 
betting decision-theoretic framework was intended as a framework for measuring 
subjective probabilities and explicating the notion of coherent degrees of expectation (de
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Finetti 1972, Chaps. 1-2, 1974a, Chaps. 3-4). Recall that in this framework, an agent is 
subject to various bets by a cunning bookie. The agent’s degrees of expectation determine 
her fair betting quotients and the odds that the bookie posts for buying and selling the 
bets, and the bookie determines the directions of the bets. The agent’s degrees of 
expectation are coherent if they are not subject to a Dutch Book, i.e. a set of bets for 
which the agent is bound to lose come what may.  
 In his later work, de Finetti preferred a different decision-theoretic framework for 
measuring probabilities and explicating the notion of coherent degrees of expectation. In 
this alternative framework, an agent is subject to a penalty that depends on her degrees of 
expectation about various events (propositions) and on whether these events occur 
(propositions are true) (de Finetti 1972, Chaps. 1-3, 1974a, Chaps. 3-4). The penalty is 
determined by a ‘scoring rule’ that is a variant of Brier’s (1950) scoring-rule. In the Brier 
scoring-rule, an agent posts her degrees of expectation about certain events and she is 
subject to a penalty that is a quadratic function of the difference between her degrees of 
expectation about these events and binary random-variables that denote whether these 
events occur. That is, letting  be any events,  be respectively the agent’s 
degrees of expectation about these events, and  be binary random-variables 
denoting respectively whether  occur (  if  occurs, and  otherwise), 
the loss that the agent is subject to is 
 
(B)   .   . 
 
 There are two important differences between the Brier scoring-rule and de 
Finetti’s variant of it. First, while in the Brier scoring-rule the penalties incur by all 
degrees of expectation have the same weight, , in de Finetti’s variant the penalties 
incur by different degrees of expectation can have different weights:  
 
(DF*)   ; 
 
where  are constants that are fixed in advance and are designed to render utility linear 
with money (de Finetti 1974a, pp. 92–93). In Section 4.4, I discuss the importance of 
having different weights for the Brier scoring-rule as a measure of instrumental value. 
Second, while (B) applies to all events, in de Finetti’s theory (DF*) is only valid for 
verifiable events. The loss function  is supposed to reflect the instrumental value of a 
system of degrees of expectation – loss is proportional to disutility and disutility is 
negatively proportional to instrumental value – and degrees of expectation about 
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unverifiable events have no instrumental value (see Sections 3.2 and 4.2). Thus, if the 
loss function is to apply to the general case in which degrees of expectation may be about 
both verifiable and unverifiable events, (DF*) has to be reformulated so as to be a 
conditional penalty:  
 
(DF)   ; 
 
where  is a binary random-variable that indicates whether the value of   is 
verifiable: it has the value  when  is verifiable, and  otherwise. Here the idea is that 
degrees of expectation about unverifiable events are excluded because they have no 
instrumental value, and the accumulated loss only reflects the instrumental value of 
degrees of expectation about verifiable events.20 
 The assumptions of de Finetti’s variant of the Brier scoring-rule decision-theoretic 
framework are that agents strive to maximize their subjective expected utility, that the 
monetary amounts could be chosen so that utility is linear with money, and that the values 
of the  are chosen so as to warrant that such linearity obtains. Granted these 
assumptions, it is not difficult to show that if an agent has coherent degrees of expectation, 
it is in her best interest to express them; for any other coherent degrees of expectation will 
lower her subjective expected utility (de Finetti 1972, p. 20). Thus, de Finetti’s variant of 
the Brier scoring-rule provides a way to measure agents’ subjective probabilities. By 
contrast, when an agent has incoherent degrees of expectation, she would be better off 
posting degrees of expectation that are different from her actual ones: she would minimize 
her subjective expected loss by posting coherent degrees of expectation that depend on, 
but obviously are different from, her actual degrees of expectation.21Accordingly, this 
                                               
20 Two comments: 1. Although de Finetti didn’t use this notation, it follows naturally from his 
representation of conditional probability (de Finetti 1974a, pp. 134-139) and his verificationism 
(de Finetti 1974a, p. 34, 1974b, pp. 266-267 and 302-313). For a detailed discussion of de 
Finetti’s verificationism and its implications for the logical structure of subjective probability, see 
Berkovitz (2012). 2. It is important to distinguish between zero loss in the case of degrees of 
expectation about unverifiable events and zero loss in the case of degrees of expectations about 
verifiable events. In the first case, the zero loss is independent of the values of the degrees of 
expectation and it reflects the fact that degrees of expectation about unverifiable events are 
excluded from the accumulated loss because they have no instrumental value. In the second case, 
zero loss is only possible for extreme degrees of expectation about verifiable events and it 
represents maximum instrumental value. 
21 Consider, for example, an agent who assigns degrees of expectation  and  to a verifiable 
event  and its absence , respectively. Suppose that  and  constitute an incoherent system 
of degrees of expectation: . Then, the posted degree of expectation about  that 
minimizes the agent’s expected loss is . For her subjective expected loss is 
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decision-theoretic framework is not adequate for measuring incoherent degrees of 
expectation, though as we shall see below it can be used to explicate the notion of 
incoherent degrees of expectation. It is noteworthy that the same is true for the betting 
decision-theoretic framework. 
 In the Brier scoring-rule decision-theoretic framework, coherent degrees of 
expectation are explicated in terms of admissible decisions. The ‘decisions’ are the 
agent’s posted degrees of expectation about various events, and they are admissible if 
they are not dominated by any other corresponding decisions, i.e. any other degrees of 
expectation about the same events; where a set of degrees of expectation  
about the events  is dominated by another corresponding set of degrees of 
expectation , if  induces higher loss than  come what may. A set of 
degrees of expectation is coherent just in case it is not dominated by any other 
corresponding set of degrees of expectation about the same events.  
 De Finetti had several reasons for preferring (his variant of) the Brier scoring-rule 
decision-theoretic framework to the betting decision-theoretic framework. First, he 
thought that the existence of a bookie might interfere with the measurement of degrees of 
expectation. In particular, he mentioned the possibility that the bookie or the agent may 
take an advantage of differences in information, competence or shrewdness (de Finetti 
1974a, p. 93). Put another way, the betting situation is in effect a game-theoretic-like 
scenario, and the interaction with the bookie may influence the degrees of expectation 
that the agent posts so that they would not be her actual ones. This problem does not arise 
in the Brier scoring-rule decision-theoretic framework because in this framework agents 
do not interact with bookies or any other agents. De Finetti also thought that this 
alternative framework would improve psychological experiments on human behaviour in 
probability evaluations (de Finetti 1972, p. 20). Finally, he saw the Brier scoring-rule as 
“a thoroughly concrete measure of success” (ibid.) though, as we shall see in Section 4.4, 
things are a bit more complicated. 
 
4.2 Verifiability, instrumentalism and coherence  
 
In Section 3.2, I argued that the verificationism that de Finetti postulated in his theory of 
probability could be motivated by his instrumentalist philosophy of probability. Recall 
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 is minimized when . A similar reasoning demonstrates that the degree of 
expectation that the agent should post for  is . As is not difficult to see, these degrees 
of expectation are coherent. 
	D d1 ,...,dn( )	E1 ,...,En	D' d '1 ,...,d 'n( ) 	D 	D'
	Exp LD( ) = α 1−d( )2 +βd2⎛⎝ ⎞⎠ k2 	d 	E
	
Exp LD( ) 	d =α α +β
	¬E β α +β
30	
that the main idea is the following. In de Finetti’s theory, subjective probabilities are 
coherent degrees of expectation and the notion of coherence in play is explicated in 
instrumental terms. In the betting decision-theoretic framework the instrumental value of 
coherence is explicated in monetary terms: incoherent degrees of expectation might be 
exploited to incur monetary loss come what may, whereas coherent degrees of 
expectation might not. But bets on unverifiable events are never concluded and thus incur 
no loss. Accordingly, the notion of coherence becomes trivial for unverifiable events.  
 The above observations could be extended to the Brier scoring-rule decision-
theoretic framework (see Section 4.1).22 In this alternative framework, coherence is 
explicated in terms of ‘admissible decisions’, and admissible decisions are explicated in 
instrumental terms. Recall that: a ‘decision’  is a set of posted degrees of expectation; 
 is admissible if it is not dominated by any other corresponding decision , i.e. any 
other set of posted degrees of expectation about the same events;  is dominated by 
another corresponding set of degrees of expectation  if  induces higher loss than  
come what may; and a set of degrees of expectation is coherent if it is admissible. Since 
sets of degrees of expectation about unverifiable events do not incur any loss, the notion 
of admissible decisions becomes trivial and accordingly inadequate for such events. 
Thus, in both of the instrumentalist frameworks above, there is no way to explicate 
the notion of coherent degrees of expectation about, and hence the notion of 
subjective probability of, unverifiable events. 
 More generally, the upshot is that de Finetti’s instrumentalism about probabilities 
dictates his verificationism. Coherence is explicated in instrumental terms and the 
instrumental value of degrees of expectation/belief about events (propositions) depends 
on the verifiability of these events (propositions).  
 
4.3 Coherence, instrumental value and knowledge 
 
The Dutch Book argument in the betting decision-theoretic framework and the argument 
from dominance in the Brier scoring-rule decision-theoretic framework are both intended 
to highlight the instrumental value of satisfying the probability calculus. Degrees of 
expectation/belief that are incoherent are less instrumental than some corresponding 
degrees of expectation/belief that are coherent, come what may; and no coherent degrees 
of expectation/belief are less instrumental than other corresponding degrees of 
expectation/belief, come what may. Thus, for instrumentalists, who explicate knowledge 
in terms of instrumental value, de Finetti’s arguments for coherence provide epistemic 
reasons for degrees of expectation/belief to satisfy the probability calculus. And the claim 
that the Dutch Book argument provides only a pragmatic reason for degrees of 
                                               
22 The differences between the Brier scoring-rule and de Finetti’s variant of it are immaterial for 
the discussion in this section. 
 
	D
	D 	D'
	D	D' 	D 	D'
31	
expectation/belief to satisfy this calculus23 is both disputable and question begging 
against instrumentalism.  
 In the literature, there have been various challenges for the Dutch Book argument. 
Some of these challenges question the claim that the Dutch Book argument demonstrates 
the instrumental value of coherence. I will consider a popular example of this kind of 
challenges in Section 4.4. In what follows in this section, I address a related challenge, 
namely the claim that incoherence might also be instrumental. Hájek (2005, 2008a) 
proposes the so-called Czech Book theorem in support of such a claim: “If you violate 
probability theory, there exists a set of bets, each of which you consider fair, which 
collectively guarantee your gain.” Here, the idea is that we substitute in the original 
Dutch Book argument ‘buying’ for ‘selling’ of bets, and vice versa, throughout (Hájek 
2008a, p. 796). Hájek considers an attempt to save the Dutch Book argument by 
substituting ‘fair’ with ‘fair-or-favourable’: “If you violate probability theory, there exists 
a set of bets, each of which you consider fair-or-favourable, which collectively guarantee 
your loss” (ibid., p. 797). While this revision alleviates some of Hájek’s concerns about 
the Dutch Book argument, it does not change his conclusion that incoherent agents might 
end up with sure gains and ultimately that incoherence cannot be condemned as irrational 
on the basis of monetary losses.  
 It is noteworthy that the Czech Book theorem is compatible with the claim that 
coherence is instrumentally advantageous. That it may be worth in some cases to accept 
or post incoherent betting quotients does not imply that it is beneficial to have incoherent 
degrees of expectation/belief. First, having coherent degrees of expectation/belief is 
perfectly compatible with taking advantage of a ‘Czech bookie’. Second, that an agent 
with incoherent degrees of expectation/belief, and accordingly incoherent fair betting 
quotients, could do well in Czech Book scenarios does not imply that her degrees of 
expectation/belief are more instrumental than some corresponding coherent degrees of 
expectation/belief (i.e. some coherent degrees of expectation/belief about the same 
events/propositions). An agent with incoherent degrees of expectation/belief is vulnerable 
in other betting and non-betting circumstances, where she will never be better off and 
sometimes be worse off than some other agents with corresponding coherent degrees of 
expectation/belief. By contrast, an agent with coherent degrees of expectation/belief is 
not subject to such risks and at the same time could take advantage of Czech bookable 
opportunities. 
 
 
 
                                               
23 The distinction between pragmatic and epistemic justifications of the calculus of probability 
has been made by a number of authors. For some examples, see Skyrms (1984), Armendt (1992, 
1993), Christensen (1996, 2004), Joyce (1998, 2009), Huber (2007), Gibbard (2008a,b), Leitgeb 
and Pettigrew (2010a,b), Weisberg (2015), and Pettigrew (2016). 
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4.4 The Brier scoring-rule as a measure of instrumental value 
 
De Finetti thought of his variant of the Brier scoring-rule decision-theoretic framework 
(see Section 4.1) as a thoroughly concrete measure of success (de Finetti 1972, p. 20). 
Yet, this decision-theoretic framework may at best provide a basis for a first 
approximation of a measure of instrumental value for at least two reasons.  
 First, it is difficult to see how a comparison between a degree of expectation  
about a proposition  and (the value of the binary random-variable that represents) the 
truth-value of  per se could provide any indication about the instrumental value of ; 
and similarly, mutatis mutandis, for the comparison between a degree of expectation  
about an event  and (the value of the binary random-variable that represents) the 
occurrence of . Probability is associated with unpredictability. It is a fundamental 
feature of probability that it is predicated over propositions (events) that are 
unpredictable. The source of the unpredictability varies. In de Finetti’s theory the source 
of the unpredictability is irrelevant. The only relevant fact is that an agent is uncertain 
about the prospects of  and accordingly for her  is unpredictable. Granted the 
unpredictability of , it is difficult to see how the truth-value of  could provide any 
indication about the instrumental value of . Both possible truth-values of a proposition 
 that is contingent will be compatible with any value of 24. Accordingly, the (squared) 
distance between  and the value of the binary random variable that denotes the truth-
value of  per se cannot indicate the instrumental value of . Further, in the above 
distance measure the highest instrumental value would always be attributed to an extreme 
degree of expectation: namely, a degree of expectation  that is equal to the value of the 
binary random-variable that denotes the truth-value of . Such a measure of instrumental 
value is implausible and runs counter to the very spirit of the Bayesian school of thought, 
in general, and de Finetti’s philosophy of probability, in particular.  
 Intuitively, the loss incurred by a repetition of events of kind  could provide 
some evidence for the instrumental value of the degree of expectation  about . In 
particular, it is plausible to infer that  has a high instrumental value if it is sufficiently 
close to the actual long-run frequency of an event of type  (and there is no evidence to 
suggest that this frequency is not representative). This intuition is reflected in the Brier 
scoring-rule: the actual loss that the rule yields is minimized when  is equal to the 
actual frequency of events of kind . By contrast, the loss prescribed by the Brier 
scoring-rule would generally be a poor guide to the instrumental value of  if  were 
neither a repeatable event nor sufficiently similar to other (repeatable) events. This is not 
to argue of course that  is an expectation, estimate or guess about the frequency of 
events of type . Rather, it is to highlight the fact that the long-run frequency of an event 
                                               
24 In de Finetti’s theory, zero probability does not imply impossibility. Accordingly, a degree of 
expectation zero (one) about a contingent proposition  is compatible with  being true (false). 
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of a certain type is often a good guide to the instrumental value of the degree of 
expectation about an event of that type. 
 The second reason why the Brier scoring-rule decision-theoretic framework may 
at best provide a basis for a first approximation of a measure of instrumental value is that 
the instrumental value of a system of degrees of expectation is not exhausted by its ability 
to ground expectations about the truth-values of propositions (occurrences of events). The 
instrumental value of a system of degrees of expectation also depends on its simplicity, 
scope, unification power, ease of application, etc., and the Brier scoring-rule does not 
reflect any of these features.  
 Setting these worries aside, let’s suppose for the sake of the argument that the 
Brier scoring-rule is a plausible measure of the instrumental value of degrees of 
expectation. Then, it follows that a set of degrees of expectation that violates the 
probability calculus is less instrumental than some corresponding sets of degrees of 
expectation that satisfy it, come what may; and a set of degrees of expectation that 
satisfies the probability calculus is not less instrumental than any other corresponding set 
of degrees of expectation, come what may. Further, the Brier scoring-rule also allows 
comparison between the instrumental values of corresponding coherent degrees of 
expectation, though in that case no set of degrees of expectation is more instrumental 
than any other corresponding set come what may.    
 In general, the importance and, accordingly, the instrumental value of degrees of 
expectation might vary. Degrees of expectation about certain events might be more 
central to a system of degrees of expectation than degrees of expectation about other 
events, and accordingly the instrumental success of the former degrees of expectation 
would contribute more to the overall instrumental value of the system than the 
instrumental success of the latter ones. Thus, the instrumental value of a probabilistic 
model depends on the instrumental value of each of the degrees of expectation it assigns 
and the importance of the things that these degrees of expectation are about. Supposing 
that instrumental value is additive, this suggests that the overall instrumental value of a 
system of degrees of expectation cannot be a simple sum of the instrumental value of each 
of the degrees of expectation that constitutes it. Interpreting instrumental value as 
negatively proportional to loss, we could translate this general idea into de Finetti’s 
variant of the Brier scoring-rule decision-theoretic framework as follows. The overall 
instrumental value of a system of degrees of expectation, , which is reflected 
in the accumulated loss  (see Section 4.1), is constituted by: (i) the ‘unnormalized’ 
instrumental value of each of the degrees of expectation  that comprise it, which is 
reflected in the loss that this degree of expectation incurs: ; and (ii) the relative 
importance of  to , which is represented by the weight  that this loss is assigned in 
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the weighted sum . Thus, unlike the original Brier scoring-rule, , de Finetti’s 
variant of this rule, , can represent the idea that, in a system of degrees of expectation, 
the contribution of each degree of expectation to the instrumental value of the system is 
according to its relative importance. Moreover, unlike ,  also reflects the fact that 
degrees of expectation about unverifiable events have no instrumental value; for recall 
(Section 4.1) that LDF effectively excludes degrees of expectation about unverifiable 
events from the sum-average that reflects the instrumental value of a system of degrees of 
expectation.25  
 Like utility in Bayesian epistemology, the scale of instrumental value is not 
universal and should be thought of as a contextual measure that reflects relative values in 
a certain context and for a given agent.26 This means that the coefficients  in the loss 
function  are relational: the value of each  depends on the relative importance that 
an agent assigns to the degree of expectation  about an event  within a system of 
degrees of expectation  about the events . 
 In the above interpretation of de Finetti’s variant of the Brier scoring-rule, loss is 
proportional to disutility and disutility is negatively proportional to instrumental value.  
Since loss is additive, it follows that instrumental value is also additive, and the 
question arises as to whether it is justified to make such an assumption. The challenge 
here is similar to the one which confronts the Dutch Book argument. It has been objected 
that this argument presupposes the so-called ‘package principle’ – namely, that the value 
that one attaches to a collection of bets is the sum of the values that one attaches to the 
bets individually – but that this principle is untenable (Schick 1986, Maher 1993, Hájek 
2008b). In particular, it has been argued that “there may be interference effects between 
the prizes of the bets” (Hájek 2008b, p. 180). A characteristic example is the non-linear 
value of money. Suppose that the payoff  for each of two bets is not sufficient for a 
bus ticket, so taken individually these bets are of little value to you. But the combined 
                                               
25 Joyce (2009, Section 5) proposes that different weights in the average sum that constitutes the 
accumulated loss could reflect the extent to which the epistemic utilities of degrees of belief 
contribute to the overall epistemic utility of a system of degrees of belief. While this proposal has 
some similarities to our interpretation of de Finetti’s variant of the Brier scoring-rule decision-
theoretic framework, it is also quite different because it is situated in a different epistemic 
framework. In both cases, the scoring-rule can be thought of as measuring epistemic utility. Yet, 
Joyce (2009) bases his notion of epistemic utility on the idea that degrees of belief are estimates 
of truth-values of propositions the accuracy of which could be measured by the Brier scoring-rule, 
whereas in our interpretation of de Finetti the epistemic utility of degrees of expectation should 
be evaluated according to their instrumental value.  
26 To assume that such a scale exists is of course an idealization. 
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payoff, , is sufficient for the bus ticket, so the package of the two bets is worth a lot 
more to you than the sum of them (ibid.)  
 In the context of de Finetti’s philosophy of probability, the Dutch Book argument 
is intended to demonstrate the instrumental value of coherence, and the objection above is 
that de Finetti’s demonstration relies on the package principle and is accordingly limited 
in scope. The argument from dominance in the Brier scoring-rule decision-theoretic 
framework also intends to demonstrate the instrumental value of coherence, and it 
similarly relies on the package principle and accordingly is subject to the same challenge. 
Although both arguments appeal to this principle, de Finetti’s view seems to be that the 
instrumental value of coherence does not depend on it. De Finetti thought that, for the 
sake of simplicity, the arguments for the instrumental value of coherence could be 
presented in monetary terms that secure the linearity of utility with money, and 
accordingly the additivity of instrumental value, and that such linearity normally obtains 
“within the limits of ‘everyday affairs’”, where monetary transactions do not change 
significantly one’s wealth (de Finetti 1974a, pp. 80-82). He preferred an approach that 
“consists in setting aside, until it is expressly required, the notion of utility, in order to 
develop in a more manageable way the study of probability” (ibid., pp. 79-80). While the 
assumption that in everyday affairs utility is linear with money is controversial, de 
Finetti’s arguments for the instrumental value of coherence are not supposed to depend 
on it. The fact that de Finetti didn’t try to generalize these arguments to cases where 
utility is nonlinear with money, and the fact that he consistently resisted following 
Ramsey and Savage in arguing for the calculus of probability in terms of preferences, and 
accordingly utility, suggest that he thought that his arguments demonstrate the 
unqualified instrumental value of coherence. De Finetti did not think that the concept of 
utility is fundamental for the explication of probability. He held that while the Bayesian 
decision theory blends the theory of probability and the theory of utility to an organic and 
harmonious structure, the concept of probability and the concept of utility have different 
‘cogent values’: that of probability is undisputed, whereas that of utility is rather 
uncertain (de Finetti 1957, p. 189). He appealed to Bayesian decision theory and 
monetary amounts because this general framework provides a convenient way to 
demonstrate the instrumental value of coherence and measure subjective probabilities. 
But this instrumental value is supposed to be independent of whether the package 
principle obtains and the particular way utility is entangled with probability to yield 
expected utility. The betting decision-theoretic framework and the Brier scoring-rule 
decision-theoretic framework provide convenient ways to identify a fundamental relation 
between coherence and instrumental value. The idea here is that, like in various other 
cases of uncovering properties of theoretical terms, one appeals to special circumstances 
in order to reveal a universal characteristic that obtains independently of these 
circumstances. De Finetti appealed to special circumstances in which utility is linear with 
money in order to demonstrate the instrumental value of coherence, which is supposed to 
	$2
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obtain independently of these circumstances: coherence has instrumental value 
independently of whether utility is linear with money or additive. This is not to deny, of 
course, the challenge that the failure of additivity poses for the Brier scoring-rule 
decision-theoretic framework as a framework for measuring subjective probabilities and 
the instrumental value of degrees of expectation. 
 There have been various other objections to the Dutch Book argument. For 
example, it has been objected that agents might refuse to bet or that clever bookies might 
be rare and accordingly incoherence might not yield sure loss. Like the challenges for the 
package principle, these objections have force against the view that the Dutch Book 
argument constitutes the instrumental value of coherence rather than the view that it 
provides a way to highlight this value. That is, the main force of such objections is 
against reductive interpretations of de Finetti’s theory, which take both the Dutch Book 
argument in the betting decision-theoretic framework and the argument from dominance 
in the Brier scoring-rule decision-theoretic framework as providing operational 
definitions of the instrumental value of coherence. However, as I argued above, de Finetti 
did not take these arguments to constitute the instrumental value of coherence, and, 
moreover, he did not think of the Bayesian decision theory as fundamental for his theory 
of probability. The upshot is that although (de Finetti’s variant of) the Brier scoring-rule 
is an adequate measure of instrumental value only in special circumstances, it is sufficient 
to highlight the instrumental value of coherence.   
 
4.5 Coherence, consistency and the calculus of probability 
 
I argued above that de Finetti’s concept of coherent degrees of expectation/belief is 
explicated in instrumental terms and that coherence is justified on the grounds that it has 
instrumental value. In this section I focus on the view that incoherent degrees of belief 
involve inconsistency and that coherence is justified because such inconsistency is 
defective from a purely epistemic standpoint.  
 Some authors argue that the Dutch Book argument merely dramatizes an 
inconsistency in the preferences of an agent whose degrees of belief violate the laws of 
probability. Ramsey presented the Dutch Book argument in this way.   
 
Any definite set of degrees of belief which broke [the laws of probability] would be 
inconsistent in the sense that it violated the laws of preference between options, 
such as that preferability is a transitive asymmetrical relation ... If anyone’s mental 
condition violated these laws, his choice would depend on the precise form in 
which the options were offered him, which would be absurd. He could have a book 
made against him by a cunning bettor and would then stand to lose in any event. 
We find, therefore, that a precise account of the nature of partial belief reveals that 
the laws of probability are laws of consistency, an extension to partial beliefs of 
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formal logic, the logic of consistency (Ramsey 1926/1980, p. 41). 
 
Following Ramsey, Skyrms (1984, pp. 21-22, 1987) argues that the Dutch Book 
argument basically highlights the importance of the consistency condition that one 
evaluates a betting arrangement independently of how it is described. Similarly, Armendt 
(1993, p. 3) argues that the problem with Dutch bookable situations “is not that violators 
of the laws of probability are bound to suffer” – as they might not suffer at all because 
bets might never pay, there might actually be no cunning bookies, etc. – but rather that 
 
their action-guiding beliefs are flawed. The flaw is that they are tied to 
inconsistency of the kind Ramsey suggests: an inconsistent evaluation of a 
single option under different descriptions. ... The idea is that the irrationality 
lies in the inconsistency, when it is present; the inconsistency is portrayed in a 
dramatic fashion when it is linked to the willing acceptance of certain loss. 
 
 Another interpretation of the Dutch Book as highlighting inconsistency is due to 
Howson and Urbach (1993, Chap. 5) (see also Howson and Franklin 1994). Howson and 
Urbach maintain that the Dutch Book argument fundamentally concerns the consistency 
of an agent’s fair betting quotients, i.e. betting quotients that the agent considers fair.  
They (ibid., p. 79) argue that the significance of the Dutch Book argument  
 
lies in its corollary that betting-quotients which do not satisfy the probability 
axioms cannot consistently be regarded as fair. ... if your degrees of belief are 
measured by the betting-quotients you think fair, then consistency demands 
that they satisfy the probability axioms. 27 
 
Similarly, Christensen (1996, 2004) argues that Dutch Book vulnerability indicates 
an inconsistency of degrees of belief and that this inconsistency is closely related to 
inconsistency of fair betting quotients. But he conceives the relation between 
degrees of belief and betting quotients as less direct than Howson, Urbach and 
Franklin envision, and accordingly, unlike Howson and Franklin, he does not think 
that the inconsistency involved is logical.28 
                                               
27 For objections to identifying degrees of belief with fair betting quotients, see for example 
Christensen (1996, 2004), Maher (1997), and Vineberg (2016, Section 2.2). 
28 Christensen holds that the classic formulations of the Dutch Book argument, due to Ramsey 
and de Finetti, demonstrate that agents who are Dutch-Book vulnerable are ‘pragmatically’ 
inconsistent, and accordingly these arguments provide only pragmatic justifications for the 
probability calculus. His aim is to offer a non-pragmatic reading of the Dutch Book argument that 
will furnish epistemic reasons to conform to this calculus. Christensen (2004) presents his 
“depragmatized Dutch Book argument” in two stages. First, he formulates it for a ‘simple agent’, 
i.e. an agent “who values money positively, in a linear way” and “does not value anything else at 
all, positively or negatively” and whose “degrees of belief sanction as fair monetary bets at odds 
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 The above interpretations of the Dutch Book argument conceive the incoherence 
of degrees of belief in Dutch bookable situations as a symptom of inconsistency of 
preferences, action-guiding degrees of belief, or fair betting quotients. The Italian word 
‘coerenza’ is ambiguous and could be translated as ‘coherence’ or ‘consistency’. Howson 
(2008, p. 3) proposes that the standard translation of the word is ‘consistency’. He points 
out that while the translators of de Finetti (1974a,b) “report that they follow the policy of 
the English translations of (de Finetti 1937, 1972) in using ‘coherence’ to translate 
‘coerenza’ ”, the translator of  
 
the papers included in (de Finetti 1972), uniformly uses ‘consistency’ and not 
‘coherence’! ... Moreover Henry Kyburg, the translator of de Finetti’s famous 
paper (1937), published in French, actually tells us that de Finetti himself 
found the translation ‘consistent’ for ‘cohérent’ “perfectly acceptable” (and 
‘cohérent’ would also usually translate ‘consistent’).  
 
As Howson (ibid.) notes, Kyburg nevertheless translated ‘coerenza’ as ‘coherent’  
 
on the ground that ‘consistent’ chez logicians just means non-
                                               
matching his degrees of belief” (ibid., p. 117). The argument is based on two principles for simple 
agents (ibid. pp. 118 and 119): 
    Bet Defectiveness. For a simple agent, a set of bets that is logically guaranteed to leave him 
        monetarily worse off is rationally defective.  
    Belief Defectiveness. If a simple agent’s beliefs sanction as fair each of a set of bets, and that 
        set of bets is rationally defective, then the agent’s beliefs are rationally defective. 
The argument proceeds as follows. If a simple agent has incoherent degrees of belief, then there is 
a set of monetary bets at odds matching her degrees of belief that logically guarantees her 
monetary loss. By Bet Defectiveness, this set of bets is rationally defective. Thus, since each 
member of this set of bets is sanctioned by the agent’s degrees of belief, it follows from Belief 
Defectiveness that her beliefs are rationally defective (ibid., p. 121). Having established that in 
Dutch bookable scenarios the degrees of belief of a simple agent are rationally defective, 
Christensen then argues that the point of the Dutch Book argument is not dependent on the fact 
that it is formulated for such an agent. That is, he argues that “since the basic defect diagnosed in 
the simple agent is not a preference-defect”, the problem has to lie with the incoherent degrees of 
belief, and “the simple agent’s problematic preferences function in the [Dutch Book argument] 
merely as a diagnostic device” that “discloses a purely epistemic defect” (ibid., p. 123). 
 As Vineberg (2016, Section 2.2) notes, in Christensen’s reasoning the so-called 
pragmatic dimension of the Dutch Book argument seems to have been merely submerged. While 
Christensen’s claim that the model of simple agent functions only as a diagnostic device for 
disclosing the defect in incoherent degrees of belief, it is not clear from his argument why 
incoherence is irrational unless it has bearings for the instrumental value of beliefs. Indeed, 
Christensen claims that “in severing the definitional or metaphysical ties between belief and 
preferences,” his depragmatized Dutch Book argument “frees us from seeing the basic problem 
with incoherent beliefs as a pragmatic one” (ibid., p. 123). But his argument for the belief 
defectiveness of incoherent degrees of belief relies heavily on what he takes to be a pragmatic 
consideration, i.e. the fact that incoherent degrees of belief could, in certain circumstances, leave 
agents worse off come what may.  
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contradictoriness while cohérence, in de Finetti’s sense, imposes additional 
constraints on beliefs.  
 
Indeed, de Finetti’s notion of coherence is different from consistency. In particular, in 
contrast to the consistency interpretations of coherence, de Finetti’s notion applies only to 
degrees of expectation/belief about verifiable events. The idea is that, unlike consistency, 
coherence is explicated in terms of instrumental value and degrees of expectation/belief 
about unverifiable events have no instrumental value. Accordingly, degrees of 
expectation/belief about unverifiable events that are incoherent a la consistency 
interpretations of coherence are not incoherent in de Finetti’s theory. The upshot is that 
consistency interpretations of coherence do not account for Finetti’s instrumentalism and 
its verificationist implications.   
 
4.6 On the accuracy of degrees of belief 
 
Joyce (1998, 2009) contends that de Finetti’s argument for the probability calculus 
overemphasizes the pragmatic dimension of degrees of belief – i.e. their instrumental role 
in the production of action – and obscures their epistemic dimension – i.e. their role in 
representing states of the world. To highlight the epistemic dimension of degrees of 
belief, Joyce suggests that the probability calculus could be justified on the grounds that 
coherence is beneficial for the accuracy of systems of degrees of belief as representations 
of states of the world. 
 Inspired by Jeffrey (1986), Joyce (1998, 2009) takes a person’s degree of belief in 
a proposition to be her estimate of the truth-value of that proposition, and he argues that 
degrees of belief “should be evaluated on the basis of a gradational conception of 
accuracy, according to which the accuracy of a belief in a true/false proposition is an 
increasing/decreasing function of the belief’s strength” (Joyce 2009, p. 264).29 Joyce 
(1998) formulates and motivates a set of constraints on reasonable measures of 
gradational accuracy, and the Brier scoring-rule satisfies these constraints. He argues 
that: (i) relative to any measure of gradational accuracy that satisfies this set of 
constraints, (ia) each incoherent system of degrees of belief30 is strictly inadmissible in 
the sense that there is a coherent system that is strictly more accurate in every possible 
world, and (ib) coherent degrees of belief are always admissible; and (ii) inadmissibility 
                                               
29 For a similar proposal see Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010a,b). Leitgeb and Pettigrew define 
inaccuracy relative to a world and they propose to minimize the expectation of the inaccuracy of 
an agent’s degrees of belief (or more exactly, credence function) over all and only the worlds that 
are epistemically possible for the agent (2010a, pp. 205-206).  
30 Two comments: 1. Joyce uses here the term ‘credence’. But since he seems to employ the terms 
‘credence’ and ‘degree of belief’ interchangeably and for continuity with the terminology of 
previous sections, I use the term ‘degree of belief’. Nothing essential in what follows will hinge 
on this terminological choice. 2. (i) and (ii) correspond to claims (3) and (4) in Joyce (2009). 
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relative to all reasonable measures of gradational accuracy renders incoherent system of 
degrees of belief defective from a purely epistemic perspective.  
 In his (2009, p. 264), Joyce notes that the constraints on accuracy measures 
imposed in his (1998) are not all well justified, that neither (ib) nor (ii) were adequately 
defended, and that the focus on accuracy measures was unduly restrictive. Joyce (2009) 
broadens the scope of his inquiry to ‘epistemic utility’, which has accuracy as a central 
component, and he concludes that “in contexts where we are concerned about pure 
accuracy of truth-value estimation, the Brier score has properties that make it an 
excellent tool for assessing epistemic utility” (ibid., p. 290). And while this scoring rule 
might not be the right rule for every epistemic context, he thinks that the fact that it has 
so many desirable properties provide compelling reasons to prefer it as a measure of 
epistemic accuracy across a wide range of contexts of evaluation (ibid., p. 293).  
 Following Jeffrey (1986), a key to Joyce’s reasoning is a distinction between 
guesses and estimates of numerical quantities.  
 
When one tries to guess, say, the number of hits that a baseball player will get in his 
next ten at-bats, one aims to get the value exactly right. Guessing two hits when the 
batter gets three is just as wrong as guessing two hits when he gets ten. In guessing, 
closeness does not count. Not so for estimation. If the player gets five hits, it is 
better to have estimated that he would get three than to have estimated two or nine. 
Notice that, whereas it makes no sense to guess that a quantity will have a value 
that it cannot possibly have, it can make sense to estimate it to have such a value. 
One might, e.g., use a hitter’s batting average to estimate that he will get 3.27 hits 
in his next ten at-bats. Such an estimate can never be exactly right of course, but in 
estimation there is no special advantage to being exactly right; the goal is to get as 
close as possible to the value of the estimated quantity. In conditions of uncertainty 
it is often wise to “hedge one’s bets” by choosing an estimate that is sure to be off 
the mark by a little so as to avoid being off by a lot (Joyce 1998, p. 587). 
 
When an estimate of a quantity  is within the range of the values that  could have, it 
is natural to assume that the closer the estimate is to the actual value of  the better it is. 
But it is controversial to assume that a good estimate of  could be a value that is known 
to be impossible for . Indeed, if one knows that a spin of an electron could be either 
 or , it does not make sense to estimate the electron’s spin to be , 
unless by ‘estimate’ one means an expectation value. Similarly, a binary random-variable 
 that denotes whether the proposition  is true can only have two values, 
corresponding to the truth and falsity of , and any estimate that deviates from these 
values does not make sense. If   denotes that  is true and  denotes that  is 
false, what does it mean for an estimate of  to be ? It surely does not make sense 
as an estimate of the truth-value of , unless by estimate one means the expectation 
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value of , or in de Finetti’s terminology the degree of expectation about . For in 
contrast to the estimate of ’s truth-value, ’s expectation could be strictly between 
zero and one. More generally, unlike estimation, it makes sense for the expectation of a 
random variable to deviate from the values that the variable could have.  
 Further, if degrees of belief in propositions were estimates of the truth-values of 
these propositions, then opinionated estimates that assign  to true propositions and  to 
false propositions would always be the most accurate (for a similar criticism, see Hájek 
2008a, p. 810). Joyce (1998, p. 579) contends, however, that this fact does not “imply 
that an epistemically rational agent must hold partial beliefs of only these two extreme 
types.” Agents  
 
 must worry about the epistemic costs associated with different ways of being 
 wrong.  … on any reasonable measure of gradational accuracy the incentive 
 structure will force a rational agent to “hedge her epistemic bets” by adopting 
 degrees of belief that are indeterminate between certainty of truth and certainty of 
 falsehood for most contingent propositions. 
 
 While Jeffrey (1986) inspired Joyce’s conception of an agent’s degree of belief in 
a proposition as her estimate of the proposition’s truth-value, he uses the term 
‘estimation’ to refer to expectation value. That is, he defines an agent’s estimate of the 
truth-value of a proposition as her expectation value of the binary random-variable that 
represents the proposition’s truth-value. Jeffrey also notes that, unlike the more familiar 
way of defining estimation as a probability-weighted sum, following de Finetti he takes 
“estimation to be the basic concept, and define probability in terms of it” (ibid., p. 51). If 
we translate here ‘estimation’ as ‘expectation’, Jeffrey’s attribution of this view to de 
Finetti is not surprising. De Finetti took the concept of expectation as a primitive and the 
concept of probability as derivable from it (2008, p. 166). He held that an agent’s 
probability of a proposition is her coherent expectation of the binary random-variable that 
represents the proposition’s truth-value, or in other words her coherent degree of 
expectation about the proposition’s truth (ibid., p. 52). This notion of expectation is not 
defined as a probability-weighted sum. Rather, it is the fundamental concept of de 
Finetti’s theory of probability.  
 Joyce (1998, p. 587, 2009, p. 270) notes that Jeffrey takes the laws of 
mathematical expectation to be “as obvious as the laws of logic” and that, when restricted 
to estimates of truth-values of propositions, the laws of mathematical expectation just are 
the laws of probability. Joyce thinks that while Jeffrey takes this to provide a justification 
for the laws of probability, he is unlikely to convince anyone not already well disposed 
toward the doctrine of probabilism.31 Joyce (2009, p. 268) maintains that estimation is 
                                               
31 Following Jeffrey (1992, p. 44), Joyce (1998, pp. 575-576) characterizes probabilism as the 
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straightforward when degrees of belief obey the laws of probability: the correct estimate 
for a quantity is its expected value computed relative to its degrees of belief, and 
accordingly the estimated truth-value for any proposition is its degree of belief. But as his 
aim is to provide an epistemic vindication of the laws of probability, he cannot 
presuppose that estimation satisfies the laws of expectation. The problem is that when 
degrees of belief violate the probability calculus, the additivity of estimation fails and it 
becomes less clear what estimates degrees of belief sanction. Joyce addresses this 
complication by taking estimation as a pre-theoretic notion that is explicated or made 
more precise by imposing various constraints on the scoring rules that are appropriate for 
measuring the inaccuracy of estimates. The idea is to equate estimates of the truth-values 
of propositions with the degrees of belief in them, explicate estimation by exploring the 
conditions that are reasonable to impose on any adequate measure of accuracy of degrees 
of belief, and demonstrates that for each incoherent system of degrees of belief there is a 
corresponding coherent system that is strictly more accurate in every possible world. 
Thus, it may naturally be suggested that for Joyce ‘estimate’ is a pre-theoretic notion that 
is explicated by the theoretical notion of expectation, and that his explication of 
estimation through the analysis of reasonable measures of accuracy of degrees of belief is 
intended to furnish an argument for the probability calculus that is likely to convince also 
those who are not already well disposed toward probabilism.  
 Joyce’s notion of estimation of a proposition’s truth-value embodies a tension 
between two different ideas about estimation: (I) the idea that the best estimate of a 
proposition’s truth-value is the one that is the closest to the value of the binary random-
variable that represents this truth-value, which favors extreme degrees of belief; and (II) 
the idea that the best estimate of a proposition’s truth-value is the expectation of the 
binary random-variable that represents this truth value, which corresponds to the view 
that rational agents should “hedge their epistemic bets” and opt for intermediate degrees 
of belief for most contingent propositions. For the sake of brevity, let us denote these 
different notions of estimation as estimationI and estimationII. In addressing the question 
“what does it mean to say that [degrees of belief] are accurate, and how is their accuracy 
assessed?”, Joyce (2009, pp. 267-268) suggests that, as a step toward answering, we can 
exploit the fact that a person’s degrees of belief in propositions determine her best 
estimates of the propositions’ truth-values and that the accuracy of such a system of 
degrees of belief can be assessed by looking at how closely its estimates are to these 
truth-values. Joyce’s principle of Truth-Directedness, which is proposed as one of the 
main constraints on scoring rules that are appropriate for measuring the accuracy of 
degrees of belief as estimates, is supposed to formulate the above suggestion. Truth-
Directedness is intended to embody the notion of estimationI, but it is in tension with the 
                                               
doctrine that “any adequate epistemology must recognize that opinions come in varying 
gradations of strength and must make conformity to the axioms of probability a fundamental 
requirement of rationality for these graded or partial beliefs.” 
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notion of estimationII. Consider, for instance, a coin toss of a certain kind, call it , the 
event  of the coin landing on heads, and an agent who maintains that degrees of belief 
should be constrained by objective probabilities whenever such probabilities are 
available. Suppose that, due to her theoretical knowledge and available empirical data, 
the agent holds that the single-case objective probability of  in a toss of kind  is . 
Suppose further that the agent has no other knowledge about the prospects of  in  and 
accordingly she determines her degree of belief in  in  to be . Finally, suppose 
that an actual toss of kind  yields , and accordingly the binary random-variable  
that represents whether  occurs is equal to . Intuitively, in this case the agent’s degree 
of belief is as good as it gets and the expectation value of  should be . Such a 
degree of belief reflects the idea that the agent should “hedge her epistemic bets” and 
take her estimate to be the expectation value of . Yet, Truth-Directedness implies that, 
as an estimate of , a degree of belief  in  would be much better.32  
It may be argued that although there is an apparent tension between estimationI 
and estimationII, the two notions are compatible. For while in Joyce’s epistemology 
actual accuracy in the sense of estimationI is always the goal, it is also important to take 
into account the risk of being off by a lot and thus trade-off between the likelihood of 
being more accurate and the likelihood of being less accurate. The idea of “hedging one’s 
epistemic bet”, which is embodied in estimationII, is designed to achieve the optimal 
trade-off between these opposite prospects. It is noteworthy, however, that the notion of 
estimationI does not really play a role in determining the values of degrees of belief as 
best estimates of truth-values of propositions. In line with estimationII, in Joyce’s 
epistemology degrees of belief in propositions are in effect degrees of expectation about 
the propositions’ truth-values, and their presentation as estimates of truth-values that are 
supposed to accurately represent states of the world in the sense of Truth-Directedness is 
misleading.  
 It may alternatively be proposed that a degree of belief in an event should be 
interpreted as an estimate of the frequency of events of the same kind, and that the Brier 
scoring-rule could serve as a measure of the accuracy of such an estimate. Van Fraassen 
(1983) and Shimony (1988) argue for the probability calculus along the lines that degrees 
of belief are estimates of frequencies. The main idea behind their arguments is that 
incoherence diminishes the quality of calibrated estimates of frequencies, whereas 
coherence enhances it. Joyce (1998, 2009) discusses and rejects this interpretation of 
degrees of belief. He (2009, p. 285) objects that calibration violates Truth Directedness: 
                                               
32 Two comments: 1. For principles that relate subjective probabilities to objective probabilities, 
see, for example, Hacking’s (1965, Chap. 9) ‘frequency principle’, Lewis’ (1986, Chap. 19) 
‘principal principle’, and Mellor’s (1995, Chap. 4) ‘evidence condition’. 2. In the example above 
I assumed for the sake of simplicity that the agent’s degree of belief is constrained by objective 
probability. Yet, this reasoning could be reformulated so as to apply to agents who follow de 
Finetti and reject the idea of objective probability or those who reject the idea that objective 
probabilities should constrain degrees of belief.  
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“my [degrees of belief] might be uniformly closer to the truth than yours, and you still 
might be better calibrated to the frequencies than I am.” In any case, the idea that degrees 
of expectation/belief are estimates of frequencies is foreign to de Finetti’s philosophy of 
probability. That is not to deny of course that instrumental degrees of expectation/belief 
in events are expected to track closely the long-run frequencies of these events.  
 
5 On the logical structure of subjective probabilities 
 
I have proposed that de Finetti’s notion of coherence is explicated in instrumental terms 
and accordingly it only applies to verifiable events/propositions. This notion of coherence 
has two important implications. The first concerns the relation between degrees of 
expectation and subjective probabilities. It is common to interpret de Finetti’s theory of 
probability as implying that every event could have a subjective probability. By contrast, 
in the proposed interpretation de Finetti’s notion of coherence entails that, while every 
event could have a degree of expectation, only events that are verifiable have subjective 
probabilities; for recall that subjective probabilities are coherent degrees of expectation, 
and de Finetti’s notion of coherence applies only to degrees of expectation about 
verifiable events. 
 The second implication of the proposed interpretation of coherence concerns the 
logical structure of subjective probabilities. According to this interpretation, probabilities 
of events that are jointly unverifiable are less constrained than probabilities of events that 
are jointly verifiable. For example, in the standard interpretation of de Finetti’s theory the 
probabilities of any events  and  will be subject to the following inequality, 
independently of whether they are jointly verifiable: the probability of the disjunction of 
 and  is equal to the probability of  plus the probability of  minus the probability 
of the conjunction of  and , and this sum is lower or equal to . Or formally: 
 
(1)   ; 
 
where ‘ ’ and ‘ ’ denote the logical ‘or’ and the logical ‘and’, respectively. In the 
proposed interpretation, this inequality holds only for  and  that are jointly verifiable. 
Indeed, for  and  that are not jointly verifiable, the probabilities of their disjunction 
and of their conjunction do not exist. Thus, the constraints on the probabilities of events 
that are jointly unverifiable are weaker than those on probabilities of events that are 
jointly verifiable. Accordingly, the logical structure of probabilities in de Finetti’s theory 
is, in a sense, non-classical. 
 Various scientific theories portray certain quantities/events/facts as unverifiable. 
In particular, in current theories of the quantum realm there are plenty of physical 
quantities that are in principle jointly unverifiable (position and momentum are a famous 
example). Thus, if the probabilities of such quantities are interpreted along de Finetti’s 
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subjective theory of probability, they will not satisfy inequality (1) as well as various 
other inequalities that obtain in classical probability theory. For a discussion of the 
implications of the proposed interpretation for the logical structure of probabilities in de 
Finetti’s theory in general, and in the context of the quantum realm in particular, see 
Berkovitz (2012). 
 
6 On some misconceptions about instrumentalism 
 
It is common to evaluate the instrumental value of theories according to the ontological 
status of their theoretical terms. Psillos (1999, p. 33) interprets Duhem as arguing along 
these lines.  
 
Duhem’s point is that the fact that some theories generate novel predictions 
cannot be accounted for on a purely instrumentalist understanding of 
scientific theories. For how can one expect that an arbitrary (artificial) 
classification of a set of known experimental laws – i.e. a classification based 
only on considerations of convenience – will possibly be able to reveal 
unforeseen phenomena in the world? This might happen by chance. But 
persistent novel and successful predictions cannot be seriously attributed to 
mere chance, any more than persistently successful forecasts of the shown 
face of a tossed coin can be attributed to pure chance. Barring persistent 
coincidences, an adequate account of the ability of a theory to generate novel 
predictions can rest only on the claim that the theory has somehow ‘latched 
onto’ the world, that its principles and hypotheses correctly describe the 
mechanisms or processes which generate these phenomena. ... Duhem’s 
conclusion was that theories which generate novel predictions should be 
understood as natural classifications and that the aim of science should be 
precisely the construction of natural classifications of the phenomena. 
 
Psillos (ibid., p. 34) argues that the best way to understand what Duhem meant by 
‘natural classification’ is in connection with what Duhem calls ‘perfect theory’.  
 
Such a theory ‘would be the complete and adequate metaphysical explanation 
of material things’ (Duhem 1893, p. 68). The perfect theory would classify 
experimental laws in a natural way: ‘an order which would be the very 
expression of the metaphysical relations that the essences that cause the laws 
have among themselves. A perfect theory would give us, in the true sense of 
the world, a natural classification of laws’ (ibid.).  
 
Psillos (1999, pp. 34-35) proposes that by “metaphysical relations” Duhem meant 
relations between unobservable entities, so that “a perfect theory is a true theory, and a 
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natural classification is what issues from a true theory.” Psillos argues that while it is 
difficult to say whether Duhem was a conventional realist, he could be classified as a 
structural realist.  
 In short, in Psillos’ interpretation, Duhem’s view is that the ontological status of 
theoretical terms determines the capacity of a theory to make successful novel 
predictions. In theories that are interpreted along instrumentalist lines, theoretical terms 
and classifications are bound to be arbitrary and artificial and accordingly (barring pure 
chance) such theories are incapable of making successful novel predictions. More 
generally, the idea is that the ontological status of theoretical terms in a theory determines 
the theory’s instrumental value, and purely instrumental theories have low instrumental 
value. This is a common view in the philosophical literature. In the context of the 
philosophy of probability, its implication is that the ontological status of probabilities 
determines their instrumental value. Thus, a common view maintains that subjective 
probability assignments, which are neither determined by objective probabilities nor non-
probabilistic matters of fact, are destined to be arbitrary and consequently their 
instrumental value is questionable. Accordingly, it is natural to think of de Finetti’s 
theory as inadequate for interpreting probabilities in science and to look for objective 
interpretations of probability or more ‘robust’ type of subjective probability. In her 
introduction to de Finetti's Philosophical Lectures on Probability, Galavotti (2008, pp. 
xxi-xxii) seems to express a similar view. She comments that as 
 
a consequence of his overarching subjectivism and pragmatism, according to 
which science is a continuation of everyday life and subjective probability 
suits all situations where probability evaluations occur, de Finetti did not feel 
the need to ascribe a special meaning to the use of probability made within 
science. His refusal of “objective probability” goes hand in hand with his lack 
of consideration for such notions as “chance” and “physical probability”.  
 
Galavotti (2001, p. 167) maintains that “the lack of consideration for the notions of 
‘chance’ and ‘physical probability’ represents a limitation of de Finetti’s 
perspective.”  And inspired by Frank Ramsey and Harold Jeffreys, she (2008, pp. 
xxi-xxii) proposes that  
 
[t]here is a widely felt need to incorporate into subjectivism a notion of 
probability endowed with some kind of robustness, in view of its application 
within “hard” sciences, like physics.  
 
Galavotti notes that, interestingly, Chapter 5 of de Finetti’s Philosophical Lectures 
on Probability   
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contains a few remarks to the effect that probability distributions belonging to 
statistical mechanics could be taken as more solid grounds for subjective 
opinions. This suggests that late in life de Finetti must have entertained the 
idea that a somewhat robust meaning can be attached to those probability 
assignments deriving from accepted scientific theories.  
 
 While Galavotti’s comments suggest that in his later philosophy de Finetti 
had a change of heart, our proposed interpretation is that no such change took 
place. De Finetti’s remark about statistical mechanics is a natural corollary of his 
instrumentalist philosophy of probability. De Finetti held that his subjective 
concept of probability could be instrumental in science in general and in physics in 
particular. To be instrumental, probability assignments should be based on rigorous 
inductive reasoning. Thus, it should not be surprising that de Finetti held that 
probability distributions belonging to statistical mechanics, which are the result of a 
long and rigorous inductive reasoning, should be taken as solid grounds on which 
to base subjective opinions in the domain of application of this theory. Indeed, 
typically the inductive reasoning that yields subjective probability evaluations in 
science is not the same as the one in everyday life. But, for de Finetti, in both cases 
instrumental evaluations of probabilities require attention to objective facts (for 
instance, observed frequencies), though not objective probabilities, and the 
evaluation of such facts is always dependent on subjective judgment.  
 The view that the ‘hard’ sciences require objective or special subjective 
probability interpretations begs the question against de Finetti’s instrumentalism. It is an 
essential part of de Finetti’s instrumentalist line of reasoning that the ontological nature 
of probabilities does not determine their instrumental value. This is a characteristically 
instrumentalist stance. The idea is that the instrumental value of subjective probabilities 
depends on the quality of the inductive reasoning that is used in their evaluation, and the 
quality of this reasoning is not determined by the ontological status of these probabilities 
per se. De Finetti’s position is based on the presupposition that humans have psycho-
intuitive capacities that, when developed and property guarded by the mathematical 
theory of probability, allow them to choose degrees of expectation that are instrumental. 
Surely, realists must share this presupposition.  
 In the realist-instrumentalist debate, the question of the role of intuitive capacities 
in inductive reasoning has been largely overlooked. An interesting question in this 
context is whether the effectiveness of such capacities in developing instrumental 
scientific theories and models could better be accounted for under realism. Considering 
the great success of theories like thermodynamics and orthodox quantum mechanics, 
which are often interpreted along instrumentalist lines, this view is questionable. For 
example, instrumentally, orthodox quantum mechanics is one of the most successful 
theories in the history of science. This theory has not only accommodated known 
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observations, it has also made many successful novel predictions. Instrumentalists like de 
Finetti would argue that such a success is not due to the theory being approximately true. 
Further, they would also reject the claim that theories that are interpreted along 
instrumentalist lines could only have arbitrary and artificial classifications that are of 
limited instrumental success, and they would find this view question begging. Thus, the 
onus seems to lie with the realist to show that the instrumental value of theories and 
models, in general, and probabilistic theories and models, in particular, is contingent on 
the ontological status of their theoretical terms.  
 
7 Conclusions 
 
I argued above that the common interpretation of de Finetti’s theory of probability is 
misguided in various ways and proposed a new interpretation according to which this 
theory is to be understood along instrumentalist lines. I also argued that the common 
objections to de Finetti’s theory are unfounded as they overlook or misinterpret central 
aspects of de Finetti’s instrumentalist philosophy of probability, and that the new 
interpretation highlights these aspects and explains how they are an integral part of this 
philosophy.  
 First, I argued that the common interpretation of de Finetti conflates the 
ontological status of probabilities with the way their values are to be determined. De 
Finetti is known for his rejection of objective interpretations of probability and his 
insistence that probabilities are always subjective. Thus, many conceive his notion of 
probability as too permissive – imposing no restrictions beyond coherence – and 
accordingly inadequate for interpreting probability in science. I argued that while in de 
Finetti’s theory probabilities are not reducible to objective properties and relations, they 
are to be determined on the basis of rigorous inductive inference from known facts. Yet, 
such an inference necessarily involves subjective judgment concerning whether and how 
the known facts are relevant for particular probability evaluations. De Finetti held that the 
ontological status of subjective probability has no bearing on the capacity of the inductive 
inference involved to yield instrumentally successful probabilities, and his followers hold 
a similar view. Subjective probabilities may be thought of as theoretical terms and, as 
various scientific theories seem to demonstrate, the view that the instrumental value of 
theoretical terms is dependent on their ontological status per se is questionable and 
question begging against instrumentalism.   
 Second, I argued that the common interpretation of de Finetti ignores the 
fundamental role that he ascribed to psycho-intuitive faculties in probabilistic reasoning. 
De Finetti saw the mathematical theory of probability only as a supplement for the 
psycho-intuitive faculties that are indispensable for the creative part of inductive 
reasoning: it is a ‘superstructure’ that supports these faculties. In his theory, probabilities 
are coherent degrees of expectation, and the coherence conditions of degrees of 
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expectation, which are the foundations of his mathematical theory of probability, only 
account for a relatively minor, though significant, aspect of the instrumental value of 
probabilities. Coherent degrees of expectation vary widely in their instrumental value, 
and an agent’s psycho-intuitive faculties play an important role in the inductive reasoning 
that single out those degrees of expectation that are, according to her judgment, the most 
instrumental. The common interpretation of de Finetti focuses on the superstructures that 
support the psycho-intuitive faculties that underlie probabilistic reasoning and ignores the 
central role that de Finetti ascribed to these faculties in facilitating the instrumental value 
of subjective probabilities. Since it is frequently claimed that the ontological status of 
probabilities determines their instrumental value, it would be interesting to study whether 
the efficacy of intuitive faculties in developing instrumental probabilistic models and 
theories could better be accounted for under objective interpretations of probabilities. 
Considering the great success of theories like orthodox quantum mechanics, which is 
often interpreted along instrumentalist lines, I argued that this view is questionable.  
 Psycho-intuitive faculties could also play an important role in explaining the 
convergence of the probabilities of different agents. When agents are subject to similar 
training and experience, their psycho-intuitive faculties are developed in a similar manner 
and accordingly their judgements tend to correspond, especially in cases in which the 
relevant information is revealing.   
 Third, while the common interpretation portrays de Finetti as proposing a 
reductive, operational definition of probability in terms of actual behaviour and/or 
disposition to behave in betting circumstances, I argued that de Finetti was anti-
reductionist and did not really intend to define probability. De Finetti thought of the 
betting decision-theoretic framework as a framework for measuring probabilities and 
explicating the concept of coherent degrees of expectation along instrumentalist lines. In 
his theory, betting does not constitute an operational definition of probability in the 
philosophical sense but rather a method for eliciting and measuring probabilities. De 
Finetti saw probability evaluations as judgments that are finalized before the betting 
operation is concluded, though in various cases the call for betting may prompt agents to 
engage in such evaluations.  
 That de Finetti did not mean to give a reductive definition of probability is clear 
from the fact that he left important aspects of his concept of probability, such as the 
nature of background knowledge and verifiability of events/propositions, undefined. His 
concept of probability is too open-ended to be defined, let alone defined in a reductive 
manner. Being instrumentalist, he intended his concept of probability to be clear enough 
and sufficiently flexible to be an effective instrument in a broad range of contexts, and a 
definition of probability would limit its efficacy as such an instrument.   
 Fourth, de Finetti insisted that probabilities could only be assigned to verifiable 
events/propositions, and I argued that his verificationism is required by his 
instrumentalist philosophy of probability. In his theory, probabilities are instruments for 
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managing expectations – they are coherent degrees of expectation – and expectations 
about unverifiable events/propositions have no instrumental value. In particular, the 
notion of coherence that pertains to degrees of expectation and renders them probabilities 
is explicated in instrumental terms – for example, in terms of expected monetary 
gains/losses – and accordingly it does not apply to unverifiable events/propositions. Thus, 
subjective probabilities do not exist for unverifiable events. The literature has almost 
entirely ignored de Finetti’s verificationism and its fundamental importance for his 
philosophy and theory of probability. Yet, as I argued, de Finetti’s verificationism has 
important implications for the logical structure of probabilities. The logical structure of 
probabilities in de Finetti’s theory differs from the way it is commonly portrayed and is, 
in a sense, non-classical. In Berkovitz (2012), I proposed that de Finetti’s verificationism 
and its implications for the logical structure of probabilities could naturally be 
represented in terms of de Finetti’s concept of conditional probability. I then explored the 
implications of the non-classical structure of probabilities in de Finetti’s theory for the 
interpretation of probabilities in models of the quantum realm.     
 Following the influence of positivism, it is common to view verificationism as a 
semantic thesis, providing criteria for identifying the meaning of theoretical terms and 
scientific claims. In the proposed interpretation, de Finetti’s verificationism is motivated 
on instrumentalist rather than semantic grounds. In this brand of verificationism, 
unverifiable propositions have no probabilities but need not be meaningless. For 
example, Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle implies that it is impossible in principle to 
verify the proposition that at a given time a particle has position  and momentum . 
Accordingly, this conjunctive proposition has no probability, but it may still be 
meaningful. For instance, unlike in the Copenhagen interpretation, in Bohmian 
mechanics a particle could have simultaneously definite position and momentum 
(Goldstein 2017). Thus, applying de Finetti’s theory to Bohmian mechanics, the above 
conjunctive proposition is meaningful but has no probability.  
 Some of de Finetti’s writings may suggest that his verificationism is a semantic 
thesis according to which the meaning of a notion depends on the way it is verified. 
Recall (Section 2.1) that de Finetti held that in order to give an effective meaning to 
probability it has to be measurable (1974a, p. 76). Further, in his discussion of the range 
over which uncertainty extends, de Finetti characterized ‘event’ as a statement that 
permits in “a more or less realistic and acceptable form, and in a unique way, the 
‘verification’ of whether it is ‘true’ or ‘false’” (ibid., p. 34), and he made a distinction 
between “genuine (i.e. verifiable) events” and “bogus events, which are either not events 
at all, or are ‘meaningless’” (de Finetti 1974b, p. 266). It is noteworthy, however, that 
verificationism as a semantic thesis is not required by de Finetti’s instrumentalism about 
probability. 
 Fifth, in the literature there are different interpretations of de Finetti’s concept of 
coherence. More generally, there are different interpretations of the concept of coherence 
	x 	m
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embodied in arguments that degrees of belief should satisfy the probability calculus. A 
popular view has it that coherence should be interpreted as some kind of consistency. 
There are various versions of this interpretation, but none of them could account for de 
Finetti’s verificationism and the central role that its plays in his instrumentalist 
philosophy of probability. Recently, it has been proposed that, if degrees of belief are 
construed as estimates of truth-values of propositions, the probability calculus could be 
justified on the grounds that coherence increases the gradational accuracy of degrees of 
belief as such estimates. I argued that this line of reasoning fails. The argument from the 
gradational accuracy of degrees of belief is based on the idea that the best estimate of a 
proposition’s truth-value is the one which is the closest to that value. Yet, as it turns out, 
in the above proposal this idea does not really play a role in determining the values of 
degrees of belief as the estimates of propositions’ truth-values. 
 Sixth, I argued that the common objections to de Finetti’s Dutch Book argument 
are largely unfounded. De Finetti formulated the argument in monetary terms, and a 
common objection is that this formulation severely restricts its scope. Further, it has also 
been objected that de Finetti’s argument provides a pragmatic rather than epistemic 
justification for the probability calculus. In reply, I suggested that although de Finetti 
presented the Dutch Book argument in monetary terms, the argument is not supposed to 
be limited to cases in which utility is linear with money or at least additive. In the context 
of de Finetti’s theory, the aim of the Dutch Book argument is to demonstrate the 
instrumental value of coherence of degrees of expectation, and I argued that this value is 
independent of the relation between utility and money and the standard Bayesian 
conception of how utility is entangled with probability to yield expected utility. Like in 
many other cases of uncovering properties of things, the idea here is that one appeals to 
special circumstances in order to reveal a characteristic that obtains independently of 
these circumstances. De Finetti appealed to the special circumstances in which utility is 
linear with money in order to demonstrate the instrumental value of coherence, which is 
supposed to be independent of these circumstances. 
 I also argued that the claim that de Finetti’s Dutch Book argument provides 
pragmatic, i.e. instrumental, but not epistemic reasons for degrees of expectation/belief to 
conform to the probability calculus is unjustified. De Finetti was an instrumentalist about 
probability. Accordingly, in the context of his philosophy, instrumental reasons for 
degrees of expectation/belief to conform to the probability calculus are also epistemic 
reasons to conform to this calculus.   
 Seventh, while it is sometimes commented that de Finetti thought of conditional 
probability as the fundamental object of probability theory, it is rarely pointed out that for 
him unconditional probability does not make sense (unless it stands for a conditional 
probability in disguise). Moreover, there is hardly any literature on the logical structure 
of conditional probability in de Finetti’s theory.33 I suggested above and in Berkovitz 
                                               
33 Milne (1997) and Mura (2009) are notable exceptions. 
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(2012) that in this theory conditional probability could be thought of as a conditional with 
a probabilistic consequent. While the exact nature of this conditional is still a matter for 
future inquiry, it is clear that it is not any of the familiar ones.      
 Finally, for want of space, I could only discuss the concept of instrumental value 
in the context of the Brier scoring-rule decision-theoretic framework and could not 
discuss the question of imprecise probabilities. These are important issues that require an 
in-depth study, and the comments below are only intended as a very brief anticipation for 
such a study. De Finetti thought of (his variant of) the Brier scoring-rule as a thoroughly 
concrete measure of success. I argued that this view is questionable as the concept of 
instrumental value is much more complex than the one embodied in (de Finetti’s variant 
of) the Brier scoring-rule. Further, it is doubtful that there is any useful universal concept 
of instrumental value. In any case, if subjective probabilities are to be instrumental in a 
broad variety of circumstances, the notion of instrumental value should be open-ended so 
that it could be specified differently in different contexts. Indeed, any attempt to 
characterize this notion in universal terms would restrict substantially the capacity to 
evaluate the instrumental value of subjective probabilities. Such an attempt would also 
run counter to de Finetti’s instrumentalist philosophy of probability, as anti-reductionism 
and aversion to inflexible frameworks are part and parcel of this philosophy.  
 Turning now to the question of imprecise probabilities, it has been argued in the 
literature that in various states of ignorance precise probabilities misrepresent one’s 
epistemic state (see, for example, Levi 1974, 1980, 1985, 1986, Kaplan 1996, Joyce 
2005, 2010, Vicig and Seidenfeld 2012, and Bradley 2016). While the work of de Finetti, 
in general, and his concept of coherence, in particular, inspired those who developed 
theories of subjective imprecise probabilities (Walley 1991, Vicig and Seidenfeld 2012), 
de Finetti downplayed the importance of imprecise probabilities. He held that attempts to 
replace precise probabilities “by interval or second-order probabilities” and the view that 
“exact probabilities are ‘meaningless’ or ‘non-existent’ pose more severe problems than 
they are intended to resolve” (de Finetti 1972, p. 145).34 Indeed, de Finetti’s 
instrumentalist philosophy of probability does not exclude in principle imprecise 
probabilities. But, as the comment above suggests, de Finetti thought that such 
probabilities have in fact lower instrumental value than precise probabilities.  
 De Finetti also objected to the common view that in various situations precise 
subjective probabilities are epistemically unwarranted because they do not represent the 
available knowledge. In de Finetti’s instrumentalist philosophy of probability, the 
knowledge that is embodied in subjective probabilities is a function of their instrumental 
value rather than the capacity to represent a state of ignorance (though, of course, in 
general one’s subjective probabilities are dependent on one’s state of ignorance). 
                                               
34 This is a quotation from the English summary of de Finetti and Savage’s (1962) “Sul modo di 
scegliere le probabilità iniziali” (“How to choose the initial probabilities”). For a different 
interpretation of de Finetti’s view of imprecise probabilities, see Feduzi et al. (2017). 
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Probabilities are supposed to be effective instruments, and their instrumental value 
depends on the agent’s degree of ignorance and the way this ignorance could be 
translated into degrees of expectation. Thus, for example, while advocates of imprecise 
probabilities would argue that the probability of heads on a toss of a coin that might have 
any possible, yet unknown, bias should be represented by an interval that spans from  to 
, instrumentalists like de Finetti might see probability  as a better (though, not 
necessarily, good) instrument for addressing such a state of ignorance.  
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgments. For helpful comments on previous drafts of this paper and discussions of 
de Finetti’s philosophy, I am very grateful to the journal’s editors-in-chief, Phyllis Illari and 
Federica Russo, and Holger Andreas, Colin Elliott, Franz Huber, Joel Katzav, Noah 
Stemeroff, and in particular Donald Gillies, Aaron Kenna, and Alberto Mura. Parts of this 
paper were presented at the CSHPS 2010, Montreal; GRECC Colloquium, Philosophy, 
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona; IHPST Workshop, University of Toronto; Israel 
Foundations of Physics Discussion Group, Edelstein Center, Hebrew University of Jerusalem; 
Serious Metaphysics Group, Philosophy, University of Cambridge; Munich Center for 
Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich; 42nd Dubrovnik 
Philosophy of Science conference; IHPST Colloquium, Paris; Theory Workshop, Sociology, 
University of Toronto; CPNSS, London School of Economics; Probability and Models: 
Instrumentalism and Pragmatism in De Finetti’s Subjectivism workshop, HPS, University of 
Sassari; Philosophy, University of Rome III; CSHPS 2017, Toronto; Philosophy of Science 
Group, CONICET, University of Buenos Aires; Colloquialism, IHPST, University of Toronto; 
and the Philosophy Colloquium, Department of Economics, Philosophy and Political Science, 
University of British Columbia, Okanagan. I would like to thank the audiences in these forums 
for their helpful comments and suggestions. The research for this paper was supported by 
SSHRC Insight and SSHRC SIG grants. 
 
 
 
References  
 
Arrighi, C., Cantu, P., De Zan, M. and Suppes, P. (eds.). 2010. Logic and pragmatism: Selected 
    essays by Giovanni Vailati. Stanford: CSLI.  
 
Armendt, B. 1992. Dutch Strategies for diachronic rules: When believers see the sure loss 
    coming. In D. Hull, M. Forbes, and K. Okruhlik (eds.), PSA 1992, Vol. 1, East Lansing:  
    Philosophy of Science Association, 217-229. 
 
----------- 1993. Dutch books, additivity and utility theory. Philosophical Topics, 21(1), 1-20. 
 
Berkovitz, J. 2012. The world according to de Finetti: On de Finetti’s theory of probability and 
    its application to quantum mechanics. In Y. Ben Menachem and M. Hemmo (eds.), 
    Probability in physics, New York: Springer, The Frontier Collection, 249-280.  
 
	0	1 	0.5
54	
------------ 2015. The Propensity interpretation of probability: A re-evaluation. Erkenntnis, 80 
     (suppl. 3), 629-711. 
 
Bradley, S. 2016. Imprecise probabilities. The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (winter 
     2016 edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.), URL= 
     <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/imprecise-probabilities/> 
 
Brier, G. W. 1950. Verification of forecasts expressed in terms of probability. Monthly Weather 
     Review, 78(1), 1–3.  
 
Briggs, R. 2009. Distorted reflection. Philosophical Review, 118(1), 59–85. 
 
Bunge, M. 2012. Evaluating philosophies. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of 
    Science, Vol. 295), New York: Springer. 
 
Christensen, D. 1991. Clever bookies and coherent beliefs. Philosophical Review, 100(2),  
    229–247. 
 
----------- 1996. Dutch-Book arguments depragmatized: Epistemic consistency for partial 
    believers. Journal of Philosophy, 93(9), 450–479. 
 
---------- 2004. Putting logic in its place. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Dawid, P. A. and Galavotti, M. C. 2009. De Finetti’s subjectivism, objective probability, and the 
    empirical validation of probability assessments. In M. C. Galavotti (ed.), Bruno de Finetti: 
    Radical probabilist, London, UK: College Publications, 97-114. 
 
De Finetti, B. 1937/1980. Foresight: Its logical laws, its subjective sources (translated by H. E.  
    Kyburg). In H. E. Kyburg and H. E. Smokler (eds.), Studies in subjective probability, 2nd ed.,  
    Huntington, NY: Robert Kreiger Publishing Co., 53-118. 
 
----------- 1957. L’informazione, il ragionamento, l’inconscio nei rapporti con la previsione.  
     L’industria, 2, 186-210. 
  
----------- 1970. Logical foundations and measurement of subjective probability. Acta  
    Psychologica, 34(2/3), 129-145. 
 
----------- 1972. Probability, induction and statistics: The art of suessing. New York: Wiley. 
 
----------- 1974a. Theory of probability: A critical treatment, Vol. 1. New York: Wiley. 
 
----------- 1974b. Theory of probability: A critical treatment, Vol. 2. New York: Wiley. 
 
----------- 2008. Philosophical lectures on probability. Collected, edited and annotated by  
    Alberto Mura with an introductory essay by M. C. Galavotti, translated by Hykel Hosni. 
    New York: Springer. 
 
De Finetti, B. and Savage, L. J. 1962. Sul modo di scegliere le probabilità iniziali. Biblioteca del 
    Metron, Serie C, Vol. 1, 81-154. 
 
Diaconis, P. 1977. Finite forms of de Finetti’s theorem of exchangeability. Synthese 36(2), 271- 
     281. 
55	
 
----------- 1988. Recent progress on de Finetti’s notions of exchangeability. In J. M. Bernardo, 
     M. H. DeGroot, D. V. Lindley, and A. F. M. Smith (eds.), Bayesian Statistics, 3, Oxford: 
     Oxford University Press, 111-125.  
 
Doob, J. L. 1971. What is a Martingale? American Mathematical Monthly, 78(5), 451-463. 
 
Duhem, P. 1893/1996. Physics and metaphysics. In R. Ariew and P. Barker (eds. and trans.)  
    Pierre Duhem: Essays in the history and philosophy of science. Indianapolis: Hackett (1996). 
 
Eriksson, L. and Hájek, A. 2007. What are degrees of belief? Studia Logica, 86(2), 183-213. 
  
Feduzi, A., Runde, J., and Zappia, C. 2017. De Finetti and Savage on the normative relevance of 
    imprecise reasoning: A reply to Arthmar and Brady. History of Economic Ideas, 25(1), 211- 
    223.  
 
Fisher, R. A. 1971. The design of experiments, 9th ed. London: Macmillan. 
 
Galavotti, M. C. 2001. Subjectivism, objectivism and objectivity in Bruno de Finetti’s  
    Bayesianism. In D. Corfield and J. Williamson (eds.), Foundations of Bayesianism, New York:  
    Springer, 161-174. 
 
----------- 2008. De Finetti’s philosophy of probability, an introductory essay to de Finetti’s 
    Philosophical lectures on probability. In de Finetti (2008), xv-xxii. 
 
Gibbard, A. 2008a. Rational credence and the value of truth. In T. Szabo Gendler and J. 
    Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford studies in epistemology, Vol. 2, Oxford: Oxford University Press,  
   143-164. 
 
------------- 2008b. Aiming at the truth over time: Reply to Arntzenius and Swanson. In T.  
    Szabo Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford studies in epistemology, Vol. 2, Oxford: 
    Oxford University Press, 190-203. 
 
Gillies, D. 1972. Operationalism. Synthese, 25(1/2), 1-24. 
 
------------ 2000. Philosophical theories of probability. London: Routledge. 
 
Goldstein, S. 2017. Bohmian mechanics. The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (summer  
     2017 edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.), URL =  
     <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/qm-bohm/>. 
 
Hacking, I. 1965. Logic of statistical inference. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Hájek, A. 2003. What conditional probability could not be. Synthese, 137(3), 273–323. 
 
----------- 2005. Scotching Dutch books? Philosophical Perspectives, 19(1), 139–151. 
 
----------- 2008a. Arguments for – or against – probabilism? British Journal for the Philosophy  
      of Science, 59(4), 793-819. 
 
----------- 2008b. Dutch Book arguments. In P. Anand, P. Pattanaik, and C. Puppe (eds.), The 
    Oxford handbook of rational and social choice, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 173-195. 
 
56	
----------- 2012. Interpretations of probability. The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy  
   (winter 2012 edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.), URL =  
   <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/probability-interpret/>.  
 
Hawthorne, J. 1993. Bayesian induction is eliminative induction. Philosophical Topics, 21(1), 99- 
    138.  
 
------------ 1994. On the nature of Bayesian convergence. In D. Hull, M. Forbes, and R. M. Burian 
    (eds.), PSA 1994, Vol. 1, East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association, 241-249.  
 
Hellman, G. 1997. Bayes and beyond. Philosophy of Science, 64(2), 191–221. 
 
Howson, C. 2000. Hume’s problem: Induction and the justification of belief. Oxford: Oxford 
     University Press. 
 
----------- 2008. De Finetti, countable additivity, consistency and coherence. British Journal for  
     the Philosophy of Science, 59(1), 1-23. 
 
Howson, C. and Urbach, P. 1993. Scientific reasoning: The Bayesian approach, 2nd ed. Chicago,  
     IL: Open Court. 
 
Howson, C. and Urbach, P. 2006. Scientific reasoning: The Bayesian approach, 3rd ed. Chicago, 
     IL: Open Court. 
 
Howson, C. and Franklin, A. 1994. Bayesian conditionalization and probability kinematics. 
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 45(2), 451-466. 
 
Huber, F. 2007. The consistency argument for ranking functions. Studia Logica, 86(2), 299- 
    329. 
 
Jeffrey, R. 1986. Probabilism and induction. Topoi, 5(1), 51-58. 
 
---------- . 1992. Probability and the art of judgment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Joyce, J. M. 1998. A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism. Philosophy of Science, 65(4),  
    575-603.  
---------- 2005. How probabilities reflect evidence. Philosophical Perspectives, 19(1), 153-178. 
 
---------- 2009. Accuracy and coherence: Prospects for an alethic epistemology of partial 
      belief. In F. Huber and C. Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief, Synthese library, Vol. 342,  
      New York: Springer, 263-297. 
 
----------- 2010. A Defense of imprecise credences in inference and decision making.  
      Philosophical Perspectives, 24(1), 281-323. 
 
Kaplan, M. 1996. Decision theory as philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Kennedy, R. and Chihara, C. 1979. The Dutch Book argument: Its logical flaws, its 
      subjective sources. Philosophical Studies, 36(1), 19-33. 
 
Kolmogorov, A. N. 1933/1950. Foundations of probability. New York: Chelsea Publishing 
     Company. 
57	
 
Koopman, B. O. 1940a. The axioms and algebra of intuitive probability. Annals of 
     Mathematics, Second Series, 41(2), 269-292. 
 
------------ 1940b. The bases of probability. Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, 
     46(10), 763-774.  
 
Kyburg, H. 1970. Probability and inductive logic. London: Macmillam. 
 
---------- 1978. Subjective probability: Criticisms, reflections and problems. Journal  
      of Philosophical Logic, 7(1), 157-180.  
 
Leitgeb, H. and Pettigrew, R. 2010a. An objective justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring  
     inaccuracy. Philosophy of Science, 77(2), 201-235. 
 
Leitgeb, H. and Pettigrew, R. 2010b. An objective justification of Bayesianism II: The 
     consequences of minimizing inaccuracy. Philosophy of Science, 77(2), 236-272.  
 
Levi, I. 1974. On indeterminate probabilities. Journal of Philosophy, 71(13), 391-418. 
 
-------- 1980. The enterprise of knowledge: An essay on knowledge, credal probability, and  
     chance. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
 
-------- 1985. Imprecision and indeterminacy in probability judgment. Philosophy of Science,   
     52(3), 390–409. 
 
--------1986. Hard choices: Decision making under unresolved conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge 
    University Press.  
 
Lewis, D. 1973. Counterfactuals. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.  
 
---------- 1986. Philosophical Papers. Vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Maher, P. 1993. Betting on theories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
--------- Maher, P. 1997. Depragmatized Dutch Book arguments. Philosophy of Science, 64(2), 
     291–305. 
 
Mahtani, A. 2012. Diachronic Dutch Book arguments. Philosophical Review, 121(3), 443-450. 
 
Mellor, D. H. 1995. The facts of causation. London: Routledge. 
 
Milne, P. 1997. Bruno de Finetti and the logic of conditional events. British Journal for the 
    Philosophy of Science, 48(2), 195-232. 
 
Mura, A. 2009. Probability and the logic of de Finetti’s trievents. In M. C. Galavotti (ed.),  
   Bruno de Finetti: Radical probabilist, London: College Publications, 201-242. 
 
Pettigrew, R. 2016. Accuracy and the laws of credence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Ramsey, P. F. 1926/1980. Truth and probability. In H. E. Kyburg and H. E. Smokler (eds.),  
   Studies in subjective probability, 2nd ed., Huntington, NY: Robert E. Kreiger Publishing Co., 
   23-52. 
58	
 
Savage, L. J. 1954/1972. The foundations of statistics, 2nd ed. New York: Dover Publications. 
 
Schick, F. 1986. Dutch bookies and money pumps. Journal of Philosophy, 83(2), 112–119. 
 
Shimony, A. 1988. An adamite derivation of the calculus of probability. In J. H. Fetzer (ed.), 
   Probability and causality, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 151–161. 
 
Skyrms, B. 1984. Pragmatics and empiricism. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
---------- 1987. Coherence. In N. Rescher (ed.), Scientific inquiry in philosophical perspective, 
     Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 225–242. 
 
Stalnaker, R. 1968. A theory of conditionals. In N. Rescher (ed.), Studies in logical theory, 
    American Philosophical Quarterly, Monograph 2, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 98-112. 
 
Psillos, S. 1999. Scientific realism: How science tracks truth. London: Routledge. 
 
--------- (2007). Putting a bridle on irrationality: An appraisal of van Fraassen’s new 
     epistemology. In B. Monton (ed.), Images of empiricism: Essays on science and stances, with 
     a reply from Bas C. van Fraassen, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 134-164. 
 
Suppes P. 1994. Qualitative theory of subjective probability. In G. Wright and P. Ayton (eds.),  
    Subjective probability, New York: Wiley, 18-37. 
 
--------- 2009. Some philosophical reflections on de Finetti’s thought. In M. C. Galavotti  
    (ed.), Bruno de Finetti: Radical probabilist, London: College Publications, 19-39. 
 
Suppes, P. and Zanotti, M. 1976. Necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of a unique 
   measure strictly agreeing with a qualitative probability ordering. Journal of Philosophical  
   Logic 5(3), 431-438. 
 
----------- 1982. Necessary and sufficient qualitative axioms for conditional probability.  
     Zeitschrift für Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie und verwandte Gebiete, 60, 163-169.  
 
Talbott, W. 2016. Bayesian epistemology. The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (winter  
     2016 edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.). URL=  
     <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/epistemology-bayesian/>  
 
van Fraassen, B. 1983. Calibration: A frequency justification for personal probability. In R. S. 
   Cohen and L. Laudan (eds.), Physics, philosophy and psychoanalysis, Dordrecht: D. Reidel,   
   295–319. 
 
Vicig, P. and Seidenfeld, T. 2012. Bruno de Finetti and imprecision: Imprecise probability does 
    not exist! International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 53(8), 1115-1123. 
 
Vineberg, S. 2001. The notion of consistency for partial belief. Philosophical Studies, 102(3),  
    281–296. 
 
---------- 2016. Dutch Book arguments. The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy 
   (spring 2016 edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL=  
   <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/dutch-book> 
 
59	
Walley, P. (1991). Statistical Reasoning with imprecise probabilities. London: Chapman and 
   Hall.  
 
Weisberg, J. 2015. You’ve come a long way, Bayesians. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 44(6),  
    817-834. 
 
Williamson, J. 2017. Lectures on inductive reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
 
